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CONSTITUTION AND STRATEGY: UNDERSTANDING
CANADIAN POWER IN THE WORLD
Irvin Studin*

“[L]aw and strategy are not merely made in history... They are made of
history.” (Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 2002)1
In Canada, after the English and the French, perhaps the most significant
historical solitudes are the Constitution and strategy. Indeed, while
Canada’s constitutional framework and its various constitutional debates
give ample expression to the first two solitudes, they are largely silent on
strategy—strategy here understood in the classical international relations
sense of ‘strategic’ instruments of state employed to project ‘strategic’
power in the world.2
*

Irvin Studin is assistant director of the Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human
Rights, Crime and Security at Osgoode Hall Law School. He lectures at both Osgoode
Hall and the Glendon School of Public Affairs (York Univerity), and is founding editorin-chief of Geokrat Magazine. He wishes to sincerely thank Warren Newman, Patrick
Monahan, Fred Lazar and Gus Van Harten for commenting on successive drafts of this
article.
1

Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (New
York: Anchor Books, 2002), p. 5

2

It is noteworthy that many definitions of ‘strategy’ privilege the military aspect of
power, as in Colin S. Gray’s Modern Strategy (New York: OUP, 1999) at p. 17:
“Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose”; see also Hervé
Coutau-Bégarie’s Traité de Stratégie (Paris: Economica, 2002) at p. 27 or Book II,
Chapter 1 of Clausewitz’s classic Vom Kriege. The U.S. Department of Defense, for its
part, defines ‘national strategy’ more expansively as the “art and science of developing
and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation-state, together
with its armed forces during peace and war, to serve national objectives.” [Joint Chiefs of
Staff, D.O.D. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Joint Pub 1-02
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 23 March, 1994) at p. 255] And economic power is
emphasized in the important volume from the Russian Academy of Sciences—Economic
Institute, called Strategicheskiy Otvet Rossiyi na Vysovy Novovo Veka (Russia’s Strategic
Response to the Challenges of the New Century) (Moscow: Examen, 2004) . In this
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This constitutional silence is hardly accidental. The seldom examined
second recital of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 (once the
British North America Act, 1867, and hereafter the ‘1867 Act’), reads that
the “Union would conduce to the Welfare of the Provinces and promote
the Interests of the British Empire.” The only provision of the 1867 Act
that explicitly references foreign affairs is section 132, although it speaks
to the implementation by Canada of imperial or British Empire treaty
obligations. But let us return to section 132 later on in this piece. For
now, one can propose with reasonable certainty that both the character and
paucity of explicit language on strategy in the text of the founding legal
document of the modern Canadian state betray a fundamental reality: that
Canada, constitutionally speaking, was never intended or expected to be a
power player of any note in the world, but rather an appendage or
‘auxiliary kingdom’ of the British empire—its instruments and
interests subsumed to the strategic designs and direction of
Westminster.3
Canada’s astrategic constitutional conception finds expression in both
Canadian constitutional scholarship and constitutional jurisprudence.
Canadian constitutional scholars and courts have been animated
historically by concerns of federalism or federal-provincial division of
powers—largely exclusive of foreign
or strategic affairs—and,
increasingly, particularly since the advent of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982, questions of civil liberties. (Much like the text of the
Constitution Act, 1867, the text of the Constitution Act, 1982—herafter the
‘1982 Act’—, in which the Charter figures prominently, is conspicuously
silent on foreign affairs; the domestic realm is king.) International
relations scholars or strategic analysts in Canada, in turn, are little
piece, let us be clear, however, that we understand strategy as encompassing both the
military and diplomatic instruments that serve Canadian (national) strategic interests or
objectives, however defined.
3

Writes Jack Granatstein in Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at p. 10: “Strategy was the province of the
imperial masters, not the Canadians, whether French- or English-speaking. […] Strategy
was not for Canadians to decide; tactics, perhaps, but strategy, never.” Surely, I would
offer, this must mean that our Constitution is at most tactical in character!
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concerned with the Constitution. They focus primarily on the international
order (or international structures, systems and dynamics), and typically see
the Canadian domestic order—politics, really, far more than the
Constitution—as relevant only at the level of strategic decision-making or
praxis by the federal government: to go or not to go to war; or more or
less funding for defence or foreign affairs. Indeed, certain species of
‘realist’ international relations scholars, borrowing heavily from the
neoclassical economic theory of the firm, may even fancy the domestic
order altogether irrelevant.
So we come closer to our problématique: the constitutionalists are
radically inward-looking, and the strategists are, with few exceptions,
constitutional philistines. The incommensurability would be acceptable
were it not for the exotic possibility—nay, probability—that, conceptually
speaking, the Constitution and strategy are but flip sides of the same
Canadian enterprise (the state), or at least the legitimacy of that enterprise.
More precisely, the suggestion is that the Constitution, concerned as it is
with law, is representative of the internal legitimacy of the Canadian state,
while strategy, concerned as it is with power, is representative of the
external legitimacy of the Canadian state. The British historian Michael
Howard says as much in his Preface to Philip Bobbitt’s Shield of Achilles.
He writes:
This is Bobbitt’s starting point: “Law and strategy are
mutually
affecting.” There is a constant
interaction between the two. Legitimacy
itself “is a
constitutional idea that is sensitive to strategic events”—not
least to a “strategic event” so cataclysmic as losing a war.
Nevertheless,
although wars may create and mould
states, it is the State that creates
legitimacy both
domestic and external, and it is legitimacy that maintains
“peace.” If states can no longer maintain their legitimacy,
or if their
capacity to do so is called into question,
then there will be another war,
the outcome of
which will create a new legitimacy.4
4

Michael Howard, in his Preface to Philip Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles, supra note 1,
p. xvi. Bobbitt himself writes in his Prologue, at pp. xxv-xxvi: “The modern state came
into existence when it proved necessary to organize a constitutional order that could wage

4
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Henry Kissinger, for all intents and purposes, alludes to this same dyad
of constitution and strategy when he defines the state as “by definition the
expression of some concept of justice that legitimizes its internal
arrangements and of a projection of power that determines its ability to
fulfill its minimum functions—that is, to protect its population from
foreign dangers and domestic upheaval.”5 And yet, if this dyad be true—
that is, if there be logical or conceptual interdependence between the two
faces of the legitimacy of the Canadian state—, then, as suggested, it finds
precious little expression in the psyche of its principal Canadian
interpreters.
Since the Statute of Westminster, 19316 at the official earliest, although
more likely, in practical terms, by the start of the Second World War,
when Canada’s declaration of war was at last differentiable (if only
slightly) from that of the United Kingdom, Canada has effectively
acquired the trappings of a proper and serious player in international
relations, including an independent diplomacy and an independent
capacity to declare (or not to declare) and wage war. It is worth
mentioning that while Canada, for reasons stated above, had no formal
diplomatic capacity at Confederation, it did have a slight modicum of
military power projection against the Americans—to wit, volunteer (nonprofessional) land and naval militias which acted in support of British
regulars, for all of which, under section 15 of the 1867 Act, “[t]he
Command-in-Chief” was “declared to continue and be vested in the
Queen” (in whom “Executive Government and Authority of and over
war more effectively than the feudal or mercantile orders it replaced. […] The process
takes place in the fusing of the inner and outer dominions of authority: law and strategy.”
5

Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the
21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 20.

6

The Balfour Declaration of 1926, issuing from the imperial conference of 1926,
evidently anticipated the Statute of Westminster, which gave the Declaration legislative
effect. Jurisprudentially, it was the holding in Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156 that
asserted, for the first time, that Canada’s federal Parliament, like any sovereign state,
could legislate with extraterritorial effect, thereby buttressing section 3 of the Statute of
Westminster, 1931, which provided for the same thing.
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Canada” was vested under section 9), and legislative responsibility for
which would lie with the federal Parliament under section 91(7), the socalled defence or militia power. However, the Canadian militia, whether
mobilized for domestic strategic purposes (such as insurrection or
rebellion) or, to the extent possible, deployed internationally—more
probably continentally—was, in accordance with the said preamble, to be
in the strict service of the interests of the British Empire. (To which the
Canadian constitutionalist F.R. Scott adroitly replied: “what does
‘promote the interests of the British Empire’ mean in law?”7) But when
independent diplomatic and military capabilities—strategic capabilities—
eventually did accrue to the Canadian state in practice, one could nary
deny that Canada was a state that, to some extent or other, could at last
project, or attempt to project, independent power—strategic power—in the
world. And, in legal-constitutional terms, borrowing from the logic of
Scott’s query, that this strategic power was no longer in the service of
British interests was less interesting a point than the notion that it was the
very existence of such independent strategic capabilities (means) that now
allowed the Canadian state to pursue strategic interests (ends) of various
descriptions and intensities—depending, inter alia, on the preferences and
chutzpah of the government of the day, as well as the strategic events in
question.
Of course, this leaves us with the remarkable paradox of Canada being
able to project strategic power in the world despite the prima facie absence
of any explicit (or, more precisely, self-consciously explicit) textual
reference to any particular strategic capabilities in either the Constitution
Act, 1867 or the Constitution Act, 1982, or in any other Canadian
constitutional text, for that matter.8 Canada’s Constitution, unlike that of,
7

F.R. Scott, “Expanding Concepts of Human Rights”, Essays on the Constitution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 358.

8

The Statute of Westminister, 1931, is part of Canada’s constitutional framework, the
definition of which we discuss below. Its section 3 provides that the Canadian Parliament
may legislate with extraterritorial effect. This extraterritorial legislative capacity cannot,
however, be properly identified with a foreign affairs legislative power per se, as it refers
to all federal legislative heads of power, and these are evidently quite different, in
functional terms, from foreign affairs properly understood. The Letters Patent
Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of Canada, 1947, a prerogative
instrument of the Queen and also a arguably a part of the Constitution, on our definition,

6
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say, Australia9, a reasonably comparable former British colony, has no
explicit foreign affairs power. And as for the said militia power of section
91(7), perhaps because it was not intended to be understood outside the
context of British imperial power, it was, according to the great Canadian
jurist Bora Laskin, scarcely developed and “never authoritatively
defined”10 in the constitutional jurisprudence.
At first glance, one could therefore be easily forgiven for presuming
that Canada’s Constitution—the essentially parochial ‘iron cage’ that
frames its internal arrangements—has not much at all to say about
Canadian strategic power, notwithstanding the said presumptive
conceptual interaction between the state’s internal and external authorities;
or, in other words, that modern Canadian strategic affairs effectively exist
outside the conceptual (although certainly not the legal) orbit of the
Constitution. Indeed, many constitutionalists and international strategists
seem to have concluded thus—implicitly, if not explicitly—, thereby
concretizing our two aforementioned solitudes. The conclusion, however,
can be shown to be quite premature. For deep in the bowels, so to speak,
of the Constitution, by dint either of genius or serendipity, lie many of the
essential building blocks of Canadian strategic power. And the argument
being made in this paper is that these building blocks can, first and
foremost, be identified, and second, that, notwithstanding the
Constitution’s astrategic original design, and notwithstanding the
ostensibly astrategic interpretation of that Constitution by judges and
scholars alike, the Canadian state has emerged with a very solid, indeed
powerful, strategic core—one that, in theory, is for the most part
constitutionally capable of projecting very substantial strategic power in
the world. Praxis, as mentioned, is a quite different matter—and this for a
even if not, strictly speaking, according to the definition provided in section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, consecrates at section 14 the right of the Governor-General of
Canada to accept foreign diplomats on behalf of Canada. This evidently speaks directly,
at least in part, to the federal government and foreign affairs—if only for the executive,
not the legislative, branch.
9

Section 51(xxix) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, states that
the Commonwealth (federal) government has legislative responsibility for foreign affairs.

10

Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1975), p. 199.
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variety of historical-political-cultural reasons. For purposes of this paper,
therefore, we will concern ourselves with illustrating the parameters of this
theoretical constitutional capability. In other words, the task at hand is to
explain Canadian strategic power in constitutional terms.

WHAT IS CANADIAN STRATEGIC POWER?
Let us first quickly define a state’s power—external power—, in
the basic sense, as its capacity to intentionally make or compel a foreign
party (usually another state or group of states, and affiliates) do (or not do)
something which that party would otherwise not have done (or would have
done). It should be stressed, as already suggested, that we are here
interested in power as capacity, not power as exercise—except insofar as
the exercise helps us to define the capacity. (Exercise, to be clear, is a
decision for government, whereas capacity can, on our argument, be
explained in constitutional terms.) For purposes of the Constitution, this
definition of state power is to be distinguished from any notion of ‘soft,’
so-called Nyean power that may be projected or, in the legal parlance,
‘transplanted’ by a state like Canada indirectly or inadvertently (but not
through any strategic design) in virtue of, or through, its constitutional
regime—for instance, the Charter—, something which may be said to be
tantamount to a ‘signalling’ or ‘demonstration’ effect on the behaviour
other states. It is also to be distinguished from the negative power (or
‘drag’ or ‘rigidity’) associated with the numerous processes of
constitutional building, bargaining and negotiation that have so marked
Canadian history—in particular over the last half century, but indeed over
most of the life of the Canadian federation. And given the above, we will
offer that strategic power consists in power that is used by the state in the
pursuit of strategic interests—such as security, sovereignty, territorial
integrity, wealth or prestige—or, more readily, power that is pursued by
means of strategic instruments, the most classical and important of which
are the state’s diplomatic and military instruments.
And so,
constitutionally speaking, let us propose that the character of Canada’s
acquired strategic power can at least partially, but nonetheless
persuasively, be explained not by the strategic interests (ends) pursued by
the state (which, again, have been and continue to be many and variable),

8
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but by the key strategic instruments, the means—in particular, diplomacy
and the military—used over time by the state in aid of such interests.
Naturally, as we are here preoccupied by the nexus between strategic
power and the Constitution, it behooves us to emphasize that the type of
strategic power of which we speak is evidently that which is exercised
through constitutionally legitimate channels—that is, channels permitted
by the Constitution. (States can, and evidently often do, exercise strategic
power through constitutionally illegitimate channels.) It stands to
probable reason, also, that, other things being equal, and leaving aside the
numerous and broadly understood possible benefits of federalism for
purposes of domestic administration in a country as vast and complex as
Canada, and also leaving aside the obvious need for a robust rights
framework that can control the arbitrary employ of government power, we
will assume that, as a general rule, the more powerful the federal executive
(the ‘strategic centre,’ if you will) in respect of the factors (or elements) of
strategic power discussed in the next section, the greater the strategic
potency of Canada’s diplomatic and military instruments, and therefore
the greater the aggregate strategic power of the Canadian state. Moreover,
because of the effective fusion of the executive and legislative branches in
modern Westminster systems of (majority) government—party discipline
oblige—, let us assume that the more expansive the legislative powers of
the federal Parliament in respect of a particular factor of strategic power,
the greater, in most cases, the power of the federal executive in respect of
that same factor of strategic power.11
11

Strictly speaking, in Canadian constitutional law, executive power follows the grant of
legislative power, as affirmed in cases like Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v. Receiver
General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437, as well as Mowat v. Casgrain (1897), 6
Que. Q.B. 12. We should also concede, naturally, as this is being written during a period
of minority federal government in Canada, that the effective identification of federal
legislative powers with executive powers is often weakened, although certainly not
emasculated (electoral mandate and control of the machinery of government by the
executive oblige) in the context of minority government. Moreover, we should note that
the association of strategic power with federal constitutional powers in certain key areas
(factors of strategic power) certainly does not preclude the possibility of federalprovincial cooperation in these areas or in the promotion of Canadian strategic interests.
(Such intergovernmental cooperation, in constitutional terms, can be understood in virtue
of the principle that legislative powers are exhaustively distributed between the federal
and provincial governments.) Nor, of course, does it preclude the possibility of federalprovincial competition or conflict in certain areas. To be clear, however, with a few
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF CANADIAN
STRATEGIC POWER
Let us also be clear about what is meant by the term Constitution.
For the Constitution of Canada, properly understood, is far more—and
more complex—than just the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982, even
though these Acts are clearly the keystones of the ‘written’ or textual
Constitution, as defined in section 52(2) of the 1982 Act.12 Indeed, a more
labyrinthine body of principles, conventions and, critically, judicial
decisions (jurisprudence) comprises the putatively ‘unwritten’ parts of the
Constitution—some of them more ‘constitutional’ than others. Writes the
constitutional scholar Patrick Monahan:
There are [...] many enactments or rules of a constitutional
nature that are not included in the definition of the
Constitution of Canada in section 52(2) These
“unentrenched” documents include all the preConfederation constitutional documents such as the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, the Constitutional Act, 1791, and
the Union Act, 1840 [...]. Constitutional conventions,
ordinary statutes of an organic character, and treaties with
Aboriginal peoples are likewise not referred to in section 52
[...]. Since these enactments or rules are not [strictly
speaking] part of the Constitution of Canada, they are not

exceptions (see the section below on national economic might), such cooperation or
conflict, in our framework, typically falls in the realm of praxis (that is, policy-political
choices by each level of government), rather than that of strict constitutional capacity for
the federal and provincial governments.
12

The definition of the Constitution in 52(2) was ruled non-exhaustive in New Brunswick
Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R.
319.
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subject to the procedures for amendment established by
Part V [of the Constitution Act, 1982].13
The Statute of Wesminister, 1931, which, as discussed above, speaks to
the legislative equality of the Canadian Parliament with that of
Westminster, as well as the capacity of the former to legislate
extraterritorially, is doubtless a part of the formal Constitution [Item 17 of
the Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, referenced in section 52(2)(b)].
The Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of
Canada, 1947, however, which empower the Governor-General of
Canada, inter alia, to approve the credentials of foreign diplomats, are not,
strictly speaking, considered part of the Constitution, according to the list
of instruments scheduled to the 1982 Act. Still, on a broader conception
of the Constitution, we might well regard these letters patent as an integral
part of Canada’s constitutional framework, given their genetic connection
to the office of the representative of the head of the Canadian state.
The 1867 Act is by a considerable margin the most signal part of the
Constitution for purposes of assessing Canadian strategic power.14
13

Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006), p. 178.
See the somewhat more pedantic definition of the Constitution given by Gil Rémillard in
Le Fédéralisme canadien – Tome I: La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 (Montréal:
Québec/Amérique, 1983) at p. 143: « La constitution matérielle canadienne, c’est-à-dire
l’ensemble des règles qui prévoient l’organisation et le fonctionnement de l’État
canadien, est formée des éléments suivants: 1. La loi constitutionnelle de 1867
(A.A.N.B.); 2. les amendements qui y ont été apportés; 3. des lois britanniques et
canadiennes d’importance constitutionnelle [y compris la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982];
4. l’interprétation judiciaire; 5. les conventions et coutumes ; 6. la common law et les
grands textes constitutionnels britanniques. » Quaere whether Monahan, unlike
Rémillard, goes too far in including the entire catalogue of pre-Confederation imperial
(‘constitutional’) statutes.
14

We know that John A. Macdonald, the key figure in authoring the British North
America Act, 1867 (in particular the Quebec Resolutions of 1864), wanted a strong
central government—meaning a preponderance of aggregate federal power in section 91
over aggregate provincial power in section 92. We also know, however, that he cared
little for military affairs and never fancied Canada professionalizing the military, let alone
being able to independently project strategic power beyond its borders. Quaere: Did this
strong central (parochial) state contain the seeds of the eventual strategically sound state
described in this article?
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Despite its provincial (or rather ‘colonial’) design, if one be creative, key
elements or building blocks of strategic power may be identified. Specific
sections—let us call these strategic sections—of the Act effectively deal
with factors or determinants of power that may have material influence on
the potency of the two said central strategic instruments of the Canadian
state—diplomacy and the military—, and therefore on the aggregate
strategic power of the state. These sections implicitly or explicitly address
diplomatic and military capabilities per se, but also such factors of
strategic power as the pure potency of the executive branch of
government, natural resource wealth, national economic might or
industrial capacity, as well as population (quality, quantity and
distribution). Granted, these categories are very stylized—even crude—,
and are certainly not mutually exclusive or, for that matter, exhaustive:
other factors, such as geography (Canada, after all has the world’s second
largest land mass)15, national morale or character, come to mind, but they
are far too abstract and indeed too diffusely treated in the Constitution,
and, as a consequence, less susceptible to serious examination.
Technology, broadly conceived, would also appear to be strategically
material for a modern state like Canada; it, however, is arguably subsumed
15

One of the more exotic and indeed fascinating categories of constitutional-strategic (or
‘quasi-constitutional’-strategic) dynamics in Canada relating to the geographic factor of
power is the Aboriginal question, as it, in many cases, turns on issues relating quite
bluntly to land—for instance, Aboriginal title claims (the legal right to occupy and
possess identified land) and Crown (federal or provincial) fiduciary obligations to consult
and accommodate Aboriginal rights (of which title is but a subset) relating to disputed
lands which the Crown intends to use. For the latter question (i.e. consultation and
accommodation), see Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, as well as
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550—two major
cases that expound section 35 of the 1982 Act. [Section 35(1) of the 1982 Act recognizes
and affirms the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.]
On Aboriginal title, see, inter alia, famously, R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. and
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. [Of course, many of these
Aboriginal dynamics are in fact anticipated by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which
solidifies the argument for its inclusion in a broader conception of the Constitution; see
supra note 13.] A proper assessment of the geographic factor of power would have to
wrestle not only with these cases, but with a wealth of highly complex and nationally
differentiated Aboriginal arrangements—constitutional and quasi-constitutional—that
variously affect the aggregate potency of this factor of power. [The Supreme Court has
not to date ruled definitively that section 35(1) of the 1982 Act incorporates an inherent
right to self-government.]
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in the natural resources and economy factors of power. And so the
contention here is that, in the apparent absence of deliberate strategic
architecture in the Canadian Constitution, the identified elements of power
may be usefully ‘mined,’ so to speak, in order to obtain a more meaningful
picture of the strategic power latent in Canada’s constitutional makeup.
We have already mentioned two sections of the 1867 Act in which the
military instrument finds explicit textual expression—to wit, sections 15
and 91(7). To these we might add the lesser known section 117 (an
executive power), which reads that the provinces retain that public
property which is not disposed of in the 1867 Act, subject to the right of
Canada to “assume any Lands or Public Property required for
Fortifications or for the Defence of the Country.” There is also, if one be
pedantic, the schedule to section 108 (the third schedule to the 1867 Act),
which enumerates as federal property at Confederation such strategic
assets as military roads, ordnance property and armouries, drill sheds,
military clothing and munitions of war. For its part, the diplomatic
instrument, as already established, finds no support in an explicit foreign
affairs legislative power. However, it is indirectly addressed in the
jurisprudence on section 132, the imperial treaty power—most notoriously
in the still contested Labour Conventions16 decision of 1937, which we
soon discuss below. And section 9, which, as mentioned, vests in the
Queen executive authority of and over Canada, applies more broadly—via
the royal prerogative—to both the diplomatic and military instruments, as
well as to many other manifestations of executive strategic power.
The royal or Crown prerogative, which, for all intents and purposes,
provides the constitutional underpinning for the conduct of foreign affairs
by the Canadian federal executive, is critical to our understanding of the
constitutional treatment of the diplomatic and military instruments. This
prerogative, which exists at common law, is said to be a vestige of the
arbitrary or discretionary power of the Sovereign. It implicitly finds its
place in Canadian constitutionalism by virtue of the influential first recital
of the preamble to the 1867 Act, which reads that the Dominion is “under
the Crown” and that the Constitution is “similar in Principle to that of the
United Kingdom,” as well as in the said sections 9 and 15 of the same
16

A.G. Can v. A.G. Ont. et al., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673.
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Act.17 And in the United Kingdom, it was the sui generis character of
international relations—a wholly functional logic—that commended the
domain to the exercise of the royal prerogative. On this, the legendary
British jurist William Blackstone wrote:
The Crown, therefore, enjoys the sole rights of appointing
ambassadors, diplomatic agents, consuls and other officers,
through whom intercourse with foreign nations is
conducted, and of receiving those of foreign States, of
making treaties, declaring peace and war, and generally of
conducting all foreign relations. Such matters are entrusted
in general to the absolute discretion of the Sovereign,
acting through the recognized constitutional channels [...],
unfettered by any direct supervision, parliamentary or
otherwise.18
The Charter—as mentioned, the central piece of the 1982 Act—also
has a small handful of (scarcely obvious) strategic sections, even if it be a
self-consciously domestic document; that is, a document that was not, for
all intents and purposes, meant to have strategic consequence. Section
4(2), for instance, speaks to the extension of the life of Parliament (and a
17

The Supreme Court persuasively tied sections 9 and 15 of the 1867 Act to the royal
prerogative in In Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753. In its
majority holding, the Court stated: ‘A substantial part of the rules of the Canadian
constitution are written. They are contained not in a single document called a
constitution but in a great variety of statutes some of which have been enacted by the
Parliament at Westminster. [...] Another part of the Constitution of Canada consists of
the rules of the common law. These are rules which the courts have developed over the
centuries in the discharge of their judicial duties. An important portion of these rules
concerns the prerogative of the Crown. Sections 9 and 15 of the B.N.A. Act provide [...].
But the Act does not otherwise say very much with respect to the elements of “Executive
Government and Authority” and one must look at the common law to find out what they
are, apart from authority delegated by the executive by statute.’

18

Book 1, Chapter 7 of Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69): http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla107.htm
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legislative assembly) “[i]n time of real or apprehended war, invasion or
insurrection.” The mobility rights in section 6 may be seen, inter alia, as a
proxy for assessing the power (or, more likely, lack of power) of the state
in determining population placement or distribution. There is the section 7
“right to life, liberty and security of the person,” which has been invoked
in several important Canadian cases, discussed below, involving strategy,
as well as the notwithstanding clause in section 33. And, of course, under
section 1, all of these rights are guaranteed by the Charter “subject only to
such limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.”
A good number of strategic sections in both the 1867 and 1982 Acts
have not yet been treated, but it is sufficient to say at this juncture that for
all of the strategic sections of the Constitution (indeed, as with virtually all
sections of the Constitution), a mere textual reading fails to convey the
actual meaning or import of the provision in question. For this, given the
scope of Canada’s unwritten Constitution, as Bora Laskin tried to do with
the militia power, one must inevitably look to the jurisprudence on each
strategic section (the ‘unwritten’ Constitution, as it were) to see how
judges have defined or interpreted each section in key cases. One ought
also to survey, in concert with these strategic sections, relevant associated
doctrines, principles, conventions and indeed, in some cases, without
making the Canadian Constitution overinclusive, certain major statutes
that may effectively be said to have ‘quasi-constitutional’ status, given
their potential impact on political praxis and the likelihood that they are
little susceptible to material amendment or repeal in the foreseeable future.
The following table (Table 1) provides a stylized breakdown of the
sections of the Constitution most associated with key factors or elements
of Canadian strategic power. Taken together, these strategic sections may
be said to make up what we will call Canada’s Strategic Constitution.
Diplomacy and the military—for all practical intents and purposes—may
be thought of as both elements of Canadian power and the pivotal
instruments or servants of this power. It is presumed that each of the other
elements of power, taken on its own or in combination with one or more
other elements, has material influence—positive or negative—on the
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potency of the diplomatic and military instruments.19 The challenge
before us, then, is to determine whether jurisprudence on each of these
sections, combined with analysis of relevant doctrines, conventions and
statutes can add ‘meat to the [textual] bones’ of each of these elements of
power (the bones of the ‘Strategic Constitution,’ as it were) in order to
give us a more meaningful constitutional picture of Canada’s strategic
power. The distilled picture may in the end prove as close to an
‘algorithm’ as possible in the nuanced interplay between the Constitution
and strategy in Canada.

19

If one be pedantic, it is more precise to offer that the relative influence of each factor or
element of strategic power on the state’s aggregate strategic power is, in constitutional
terms, a function both of the potential raw magnitude or scope of the factor or element
and, just as importantly, the extent to which all or part of that factor or element can be
mobilized to inform one or both of the state’s diplomatic and military instruments. It
should also be noted that we are here interested in the case law for each of the strategic
sections of the Constitution, and not, strictly speaking, case law relating to the specific
categories or factors or elements (per se) of power, mindful as we are of the warning of
Justice Beetz in the Anti-Inflation Reference, infra note 53, that excessively diffuse
subject matters should not be seen as a legitimate basis for exclusive legislative power for
either the federal or provincial government.

16

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

Table 1: Canada’s Strategic Constitution
Power Element \
Document

Constitution Act, 1867

Diplomacy

Preamble/royal
prerogative; ss. 9; s.
91 general power
(POGG); 132
Preamble/royal
prerogative; ss. 9, 15;
91(7); 108; 117
Preamble/royal
prerogative; ss. 9;
POGG; 91(11); 91(29);
92(10)(c); 91(27)
ss. 91(1A); 92A; 95;
108; 109

Military

Executive Strength of
Central (Federal)
Government
Natural Resources (and
Food)
Economy

Population

Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (in Constitution
Act, 1982)*

ss. 1; 4(2); 6; 7-14; 33

POGG; ss. 91(1A);
91(2); 91(3); 92(10);
92(13); 92(16)
ss. 91(25); 95

*The Charter provisions that make up Canada’s Strategic Constitution are those that are
most likely to come into play against (or indeed, suffuse) exercises of government power
based on the common law or legislative heads of powers cited in the 1867 and 1982 Acts.
In this sense, they cannot easily be separated into discrete categories along the lines of the
various elements or factors of power listed in the second column.

FEDERALISM
Without a doubt, a defining characteristic of the Canadian
Constitution is its federal character.
Sovereignty—executive and
legislative power—is divided exhaustively between the federal and
provincial governments. And notwithstanding the absence of a formal
federal foreign affairs power or genuine strategic intent, the Constitution
Act, 1867, textually speaking, paints the picture of a reasonably centralized
federation. On paper, the federal government may still disallow provincial
legislation or, via a provincial lieutenant-governor, reserve provincial
legislation for approval by the federal government, even if by
constitutional convention these capacities are widely thought to be
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obsolete. More relevant, however, is the reality that most of the levers of
strategic power—the militia, along with significant macroeconomic,
criminal law, emergency and nationalization powers—are prima facie
housed with the federal Parliament and government.
Legislative
responsibility for immigration, a key lever for increasing the quantity and
quality of the national population, which in turn provides fuel for the
state’s military, diplomatic corps and industrial base, is divided between
Parliament and the provincial legislatures, subject to federal paramountcy;
that is, provincial immigration legislation is operative only insofar as it is
non-repugnant to federal legislation. Parliament also has concurrent but
overriding legislative authority over agriculture, which is indissociably
linked with food supply. (We very briefly discuss agriculture and food
supply in our section on natural resources.) Having said this, legislative
responsibility for more traditional natural resources—minerals, metals,
forestry and energy goods—, rather astrategically, lies with the provinces,
a fact concretized by the 1982 insertion into the 1867 Act of section 92A.
(We might also note, parenthetically, that legislative responsibility for
education, among many other variables, is with the provinces. And while
we have not identified education as a strict strategic factor or element of
power, a none too ambitious case could likely be made that the training—
intellectual, cultural and other—of the national population may impact the
quality of the diplomatic and military instruments of the state, and that,
conversely, the absence of such a lever for Parliament may mean that,
quite astrategically, the federal state has little direct control over the
‘talent’ that eventually populates and runs Canadian diplomacy and the
Canadian Forces.)
Jurisprudence in each of the above strategic areas has in many cases
drastically altered the prima facie design of the fathers of Confederation.
The federation has become far more decentralized than planned. We
discuss the jurisprudence, over the course of this article, for each of the
strategic sections outlined in Table 1. For now, however, it is enough to
note that prior to the advent of the Charter (a largely afederal document),
the ‘world-view’ of Canadian jurisprudence—even in respect of matters
strategic—was conditioned almost unexceptionally by concerns of
domestic federalism. It follows that commentators like H. Scott Fairley
have suggested that “[i]n the absence of textual guidance, notions of
divided autonomy gleaned from the jurisprudence of Canadian federalism,
not the implications of national sovereignty [or national strategic power,
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for that matter], came to dominate the judicial interpretation of
constitutional principle in relation to the subject of external affairs.”20
The point is that, because of the astrategic conception of the
Constitution, and because, the Charter aside, the courts (the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council chief among them) have by and large
tended to see the “judicial process of applying the federal principle to a
symmetrical distribution of legislative and executive powers [as
providing] a complete and powerful account of the Canadian federal
state,”21 the serious business of strategy has nary been explored in their
interpretation of the Constitution; at least not in a conscientious sense.
This is as much a problem of constitutional design as it is of
jurisprudential culture, but the implication is just the same: the
Constitution has to date not been interpreted by judges in a way that is
properly sensitive to the legitimate strategic role that the Canadian state
today plays and indeed may play (again, if it so wishes) in practice. That
is, the general inward-lookingness of Canadian jurisprudence—obsessed
as it has been with questions of division of powers and, since 1982,
Charter rights—has understandably failed to give proper weight to the
factual emergence, in policy-political terms, of a Canadian international
strategic personality. And still, we argue here that notwithstanding this
lack of strategic culture in the judicature (and among jurists), the
constitutional structure or framework that has emerged over the years is in
many, although not all, critical respects strategically solid, and the
Canadian state as a result strategically powerful—in constitutional terms.
(We stress here once more that this power to which we refer is capacity,
rather than exercise.)
Finally, it behooves us to note the exceptional case of Quebec. In
strategic terms, Quebec has been by some margin the greatest
20

H. Scott Fairley, Canada, External Affairs and the Constitution: A Theory of Judicial
Review (S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law School, 1987) [unpublished], p. 6. See also
R.C.B. Risk, “Constitutional Scholarship in the Nineteenth Century: Making Federalism
Work” (1996) U.T.L.J. 427-457. Risk notes at p. 432 that nineteenth century English
Canadian legal scholars shared one basic belief: that “the essence of the Canadian
constitution was the British constitution coupled with federalism […].”
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Ibid., p. 46.
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complicating factor in Canadian federalism and, by extension, for
Canadian strategic power. Like several other provinces, Quebec has an
ambitious programme of so-called ‘constituent (provincial) diplomacy,’ in
which it engages with other nation-states and sub-national units in its areas
of constitutional responsibility. Indeed, since the Quiet Revolution of the
1960s, all Quebec governments have, for all intents and purposes, been
guided by the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, which holds that, in its areas of
constitutional jurisdiction (sections 92, 92A, 93 and 95 of the 1867 Act),
Quebec’s powers are not limited to the territorial province. The vast
majority of this ‘diplomacy’ is transactional, falling well below the
threshold of what we understand to be strategic. (It stands to reason that
partial diplomatic representation for Quebec in international cultural
organizations like UNESCO—a state of affairs negotiated under the
Martin government and confirmed under the last Harper government—is
of far less strategic consequence than potential diplomatic lobbying by that
province’s government for political recognition among foreign states in
the context of future Canadian constitutional crises.) However, Quebec
has also in practice been at the core of two conscription crises and was
quite possibly material to the 2003 decision of the federal government not
to go to war in Iraq, given the historical antipathy of the Québécois to
distant military adventure. And yet the province’s disproportionate
strategic impact on the federal state appears little explained, strictly
speaking, by the Constitution—textually or jurisprudentially. Both the
Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 make asymmetric references to
traditional Quebec concerns or, by proxy, French language, cultural and
religious or denominational predilections and protections. Moreover, the
Quebec Act, 1774, the basic principles of which are arguably part of the
above mentioned ‘unentrenched’ constitution, in section 8 stated that “in
all matters relative to property and civil rights, resort shall be had to the
[pre-conquest French civil law] for the decision of the same.” Such
asymmetrical references may well have given Quebec de facto, although
not de jure, special status in Canada, but they do not appear,
constitutionally speaking, to pertain directly to the elements of the
strategic power of the state; that is, they principally refer almost strictly to
the internal arrangements of the Canadian state.
In fact, however, Quebec is very much at the heart of the constitutionalstrategic logic of Canadian federalism—in at least two key senses. First,
naturally, let us concede that Quebec, then Canada-East, was extremely
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influential in the original division of legislative powers, strategic and
otherwise, in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.22 (The
reference to “property and civil rights” in the old Quebec Act led directly
to the influential vernacular of “property and civil rights” in section 92(13)
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which, as will be explained later, has been
the bane of the highly strategic federal trade and commerce power.23)
Second, a number of commentators have suggested (controversially, one
should add) that a number of decentralizing Privy Council and even
Supreme Court decisions—strategic and otherwise—in the last century
were much in keeping with, and may have even been based upon a certain
22

In his recent book, John A., The Man Who Made Us – Volume 1 (Toronto: Random
House, 2007), Richard Gwyn observes that, although the division of powers has been for
Canada a perennial topic of political and jurisprudential debate, it was scarcely debated in
the very rapid drafting of the Quebec Resolutions at the Quebec Conference in 1864.
Having said this, I would argue that many of the section 92 (and 93) heads of provincial
power, starting with section 92(13) on property and civil rights, were strongly anticipated
by earlier imperial acts in British North America, such as the Quebec Act, 1774. I would
also humbly wager that fathers of Confederation like G.E. Cartier and E.P. Taché, both
avowed French-Canadian autonomistes, would have made their preferences for certain
section 92 powers exceedingly plain to Macdonald as he prepared the consolidated
position of the United Province of Canada in the period prefatory to the Quebec
Conference.

23

In the pivotal case of Citizens’ Insurance v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council used the logic of section 94 of the 1867 Act relating to
uniformity of laws relating to ‘property and civil rights’ among three of the four original
provinces (Quebec excluded) to deduce that the laws in question referred to the
equivalent of the body of laws covered exceptionally by the Quebec Civil Code (at the
time the Code civil du Bas-Canada, predicated on the coutumes de Paris) for the
province of Quebec. As such, the property and civil rights section [section 91(13)] of the
1867 Act became a de facto residuary clause in the jurisprudence for all matter of ‘civil
law’ (non criminal law) questions, including, inter alia, contractual rights, labour
relations, securities regulation and agricultural products. For the record, section 94 reads
as follows: “Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Parliament of Canada may make
Provision for the Uniformity of all or any of the Laws relative to Property and Civil
Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and of the Procedure of all or any of
the Courts in those Three Provinces, and from and after the passing of any Act in that
Behalf the Power of the Parliament of Canada to make Laws in relation to any Matter
comprised in any such Act shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act, be unrestricted;
but any Act of the Parliament of Canada making Provision for such Uniformity shall not
have effect in any Province unless and until it is adopted and enacted as Law by the
Legislature thereof.”
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reading of the political winds in Canada; centrifugal winds that often blew
strongest and indeed continue to blow strongest from Quebec. Wrote
Trudeau in Federalism and the French Canadians: “[i]f the law lords had
not leaned in that [provincial] direction, Quebec separation might not be a
threat today; it might be an accomplished fact.”24

DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy is one of the two cardinal instruments of Canadian
strategic power identified in this paper. The other instrument is the
military. Both diplomacy and the military are also, as mentioned, factors
or elements of this strategic power. As elements, both evidently influence
aggregate national strategic power, as expressed by these same diplomatic
and military instruments. (For instance, in simple terms, a strong military
influences not only the military, by identity, but may also, as with, say,
major economic capacity, greatly enhance diplomacy.) Of diplomacy, the
German-American power theorist Hans Morgenthau once wrote:
Of all the factors that make for the power of a nation, the
most important, however unstable, is the quality of
diplomacy. [...] The conduct of a nation’s foreign affairs by
its diplomats is for national power in peace what military
strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national
power in war. It is the art of bringing the different elements
of the national power to bear with maximum effect upon

24

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: MacMillan,
1968), p. 198. Of course, this may be a slightly tendentious view—one that neglects the
obvious role of Ontario, especially under the rule of Oliver Mowatt, in driving a number
of the Privy Council challenges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Still,
even in consulting today what is arguably one of the two leading constitutional treatises
in Quebec, Droit constitutionnel, 4e éd. (Québec: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2002), by Henri
Brun and Guy Tremblay, one quickly observes that the decentralist imperative is a clear
leitmotiv. Granted, a perhaps equally influential text, the late Gérald-A. Beaudoin’s La
constitution du Canada: institutions, partage des pouvoirs, Charte canadienne des droits
et libertés (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltée, 2004), does not have evidence of such a
leitmotiv.
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those points in the international situation which concern the
national interest most directly.25
Of course, with the decline of the conventional foreign ministry and
the concomitant rise of internationally active ‘domestic’ ministries (or, in
the case of Canada, the effective return to the original model of the prime
minister as foreign minister), it is not just diplomats who carry out the
business of diplomacy. Rather, diplomacy as we here understand it, is
broadly conceived to include such subsidiary strategic instruments as,
inter alia, treaties (including trade and investment agreements, although
we discuss these in the section on national economic might), development
aid, sanctions, intelligence and ‘information sharing.’ It also includes such
strategic capabilities as coercion, negotiation, lobbying, important
(strategic) appointments and the international deployment of certain
national assets. We will treat only some of these.
One quickly notes that treaties, while once considered the principal and
classical currency of state-to-state diplomacy, are today but one of
multiple instruments of strategic diplomacy—indeed, arguably a
diminishing one in Canadian politics, both in absolute and relative terms.26
And yet, paradoxically, because of the proliferation of scholarly
commentary on the Labour Conventions case of 1937,27—which, in
25

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 155.

26

L. Wildhaber writes in Treaty-Making Power and Constitution: An International and
Comparative Study (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1971) at p. 1: “A cursory
examination of the United States Constitution demonstrates that at the end of the 18th
century, the conduct of foreign relations included relatively few matters: war, neutrality,
and peace; treaties; foreign commerce; transfer of territory; appointment and reception of
diplomats; definition and punishment of crimes against international law (piracy). Today,
the scope, density and intensity of foreign relations have significantly increased, decisionmaking techniques have changed, the range of diplomatic instruments has been refined.”
Indeed, in the United States, since the Second World War, congressional-executive
(international) agreements have been used with greater frequency than formal treaties by
a significant factor. See infra note 30.
27

See, inter alia, Torsten H. Strom and Peter Finkle, “Treaty Implementation: The
Canadian Game Needs Australian Rules” (1993) 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 39; G.V. La Forest
“The Labour Conventions Case Revisited” (1974) 12 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 137; R. St. J.
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interpreting the imperial treaty implementation provision of section 132 of
the 1867 Act, and in conceiving of the division of powers between the
federal and provincial governments as “watertight compartments,”
distributed treaty implementation power between the federal and
provincial governments (depending on whether a treaty subject matter falls
under federal, provincial or joint jurisdiction)—, the constitutional debate
about foreign affairs (or, more broadly, strategy) in Canada is to this day
disproportionately preoccupied with the question of treaties. Specifically,
the critics of the decision in the Labour Conventions case continue to
denounce it as having emasculated not only the federal treaty
implementation power, but also, in practice, the federal capacity to
negotiate international treaties purposefully and efficiently, a power
formally and exclusively reserved for the federal government under the
royal prerogative—forced as the federal government often is to pre-consult
extensively, and sometimes unsuccessfully, with provinces.
From a strictly strategic perspective, the critique is not misplaced. The
state of the Canadian federal treaty power stands in marked contrast, for
instance, with that of the Australian Commonwealth (federal)
government—as mentioned, a government highly comparable to that of
Canada—, for which the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,
1900 provides an explicit external affairs power in section 51(xxix), and
for which the Australian High Court decided favourably in two landmark
cases involving treaty powers in the early 1980s: Koowarta28 and, most
importantly, Tasmanian Dam29. In both cases, the High Court affirmed
Macdonald, “International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada” (1975) 2
Dalhousie L.J. 307; R.E. Sullivan, “Jurisdiction to Negotiate and Implement Free Trade
Agreements in Canada (1987) 24:2 U.W.O. L. Rev. 63; and the famous piece by F.R.
Scott, “Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wright’s Undisclosed Dissent?” (1956) 34 Can.
Bar Rev. 114. This is a small sample. By comparison, there are terribly few scholarly
pieces on the relationship between the Constitution and foreign affairs or the Constitution
and defence, including in the canonical Peter Hogg text, [Constitutional Law of Canada,
2007 student ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2007), and none at all, it appears, on the
broader relationship between the Constitution and strategy.
28

29

Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982), 153 C.L.R. 168.

Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983), 158 C.L.R. 1. Note: The U.S. Constitution, for
its part, provides for the executive branch (the President) to negotiate international
treaties, and for these to be approved by two-thirds of the members of the Senate (part of
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that the Commonwealth government had constitutional authority, under
section 51 (xxix), to unilaterally implement international treaties, even
those affecting areas of State responsibility. Suffice it to say that the
Commonwealth government has since been very activist in strategically
(on occasion, some might suggest even colourably) levering the external
affairs section and the concomitant expansive treaty power. (By contrast,
as a practical example of the strategic emasculation of the Canadian
federal executive in the area of treaties, even at the negotiation phase, the
Government of Canada has to date had considerable difficulty agreeing on
a consolidated ‘Canadian’ position in respect of a number of major trade
deals, including with the European Union, as a result of the need to
regularly consult the provinces on jurisdictional matters that would
presumably affect the implementability of an eventual agreement.)30
the legislative branch). A treaty thus approved by the Senate becomes the law of the
land, irrespective of whether the subject matter of the treaty would traditionally fall under
federal or state jurisdiction. Power over funding of treaty obligations lies with the
legislative branch (all of Congress), not with the executive branch.
30

Comparisons of Canadian and Australian treaty powers with those of the United States
are not obviously instructive, although wholly interesting. Article II, section 2, clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur […].” As in Australia, federalism concerns in America, as famously
affirmed in Missouri v. Holland [252 U.S. 416 (1920)], do not constitute a substantial bar
to the subject matter of American treaty-making, given that treaties become “the supreme
Law of the Land,” according to Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, and in spite of
the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the States (and the American people)
constitutional powers not otherwise delegated to the federal government. However, the
“advice and consent” requirement can often mean that the Senate (part of the legislative
branch) may meaningfully influence or condition executive (presidential) negotiation of
international treaties. The need to satisfy a Senate supermajority for passage of treaties
would also doubtless be assimilated into executive negotiation—and, in this sense, the
U.S. federal legislative branch could be thought to play a role somewhat akin to that of
Canada’s provinces in dulling the potency of the federal diplomatic function. That said,
treaties in the U.S. have been in great decline since the Second World War, with the
executive branch heavily privileging congressional-executive agreements (or, more
rarely, where the executive has plenary power, sole executive agreements) over proper
treaties on a wide variety of subject matters; see, for instance, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement and bilateral or trilateral tariff (trade) agreements such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These congressional-executive
agreements require approval by simple majority in both houses of Congress, and originate
in statutes authorizing the President to negotiate and enter into given agreements with
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Labour Conventions notwithstanding, Canadian diplomatic activity—as
defined in this paper—remains highly concentrated in the federal
executive. This is very much on account of, and consistent with, the
continued dominance of the royal prerogative in strategic affairs. And
while legislation in Canada has gradually clipped or displaced the royal
prerogative (which, as we will recall, exists at common law) in matters
purely domestic or otherwise astrategic, there has in Canada been a
distinctive dearth of legislative override of the prerogative in matters
external or (to a lesser extent) strategic. (Where there is proper foreign
affairs legislation, it would typically fall under the section 91 general
power, as a residual power.) The Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Act—to take perhaps the most obvious example—is
notoriously laconic (in all, only thirteen sections long) and transactional.
Moreover, until the recent passage of a private member’s bill (Bill C293)—the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act—, there
existed no formal Canadian legislation touching on international
development assistance. This new Act defines official development
assistance (ODA) in law and provides for specific and regular reporting
requirements on Canadian ODA activities by the government to
Parliament. Still, the Act leaves much of the royal prerogative of the
government untouched, which means that the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) remains without formal enabling legislation
and that its activities are still largely governed by the prerogative—
presumably consistent with the predilection of the government; hence,
presumably, its support of the private member’s bill.
What of intelligence? We discuss security intelligence below, noting
that Canada does not at this time of writing have a pure or classical foreign
intelligence agency. Having said this, a new (human) foreign intelligence
agency, once softly mooted and later abandoned by the last Harper
government, distinct from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
foreign governments. They are, as a general rule, easier to approve and amend in
Congress than treaties—hence their strategic attractiveness to the American executive
branch. The constitutionality of the NAFTA—by implication, congressional-executive
(trade) agreements—in American law was upheld as a non-justiciable political question
in USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), with the U.S.
Supreme Court subsequently denying review of the case.
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(CSIS) and operating outside the strict ambit of both sections 12 and 16 of
the CSIS Act (itself ‘quasi-constitutional,’ on our loose understanding),
could arguably be stood up on the strength of the royal prerogative alone;
that is, without enabling legislation.31 The Canadian Forces, outside of the
(foreign) communications intelligence capability provided by the
Canadian Security Establishment (CSE)32, which is regulated under the
31

Section 12 of the CSIS Act restricts CSIS intelligence activities strictly to suspected
threats relating to the security of Canada (in other words, to security intelligence). It
should be noted, however, that in the important holding in Henrie v. Canada, [1989] 2
F.C. 229, the Federal Court specified that “[t]here are few limits upon the kinds of
security information, often obtained on a long-term basis, which may prove useful in
identifying a threat.” CSIS generally views section 12 as having no territorial restriction,
provided the intelligence sought is of a ‘security’ nature. (This extraterritorial
assumption was questioned in Justice Blanchard’s obiter in the recent case Re. Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1780.) Section 16, for its part,
geographically restricts CSIS intelligence activities relating to the defence of Canada and
Canadian foreign affairs—in essence, the military and diplomatic instruments that
concern us here—to territorial Canada. A proper foreign intelligence agency, on the
strength of the royal prerogative, could presumably at least allow for intelligence
activities relating to defence and diplomacy outside of Canada. A decision by the
government to launch the agency, whether publicized or not, would not itself be subject
to the Charter, as it would be considered an executive decision of high policy. A more
controversial question, however, is whether the foreign activities of the agency’s
employees or operatives would be subject to the Charter. Until the recent holding in
Khadr, discussed below at note 44, one could rely on Hape, discussed below at note 42,
and also Re. Canadian Security Intelligence Act, which affirms Hape, to presume that the
Charter does not, absent the consent of the host state, apply to Canadian intelligence
activities abroad. Khadr now seems to have greatly complicated (indeed, confused)
things, apparently implying that involvement by Canadian government agents, even
potential foreign intelligence agents, in processes that are illegal at international law,
could be considered contrary to at least section 7 of the Charter—to wit, the fundamental
justice (procedural) requirement.

32

In addition to foreign signals intelligence, the CSE is also responsible for the protection
of the Government of Canada’s electronic information infrastructure, and of information
infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada. Its legislative basis under
the National Defence Act was enacted only in 2001 via the Anti-Terrorism Act. Prior to
that, the agency operated via the royal prerogative. It is also interesting to note that
Canada’s geography, although a factor of power largely too abstract to properly capture
in constitutional terms, is given concrete strategic expression through the signals
intelligence function; that is, Canada’s vast geography (and indeed its proximity to major
strategic players like Russia and a number of Asian states) is levered by virtue of the
constitutional power of the federal government, previously under the prerogative and now
under the militia power, to collect signals intelligence in relation to foreign enemies and
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National Defence Act, already enjoy such an in-house, albeit small, foreign
(human) and analytic (indeed, ‘all-sources’) intelligence capability in the
form of the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) organization, which
operates solely under the aegis of the royal prerogative. Similarly, to take
but one more example, the existence and character of diplomatic
reporting—quasi-foreign intelligence, as it were—emanating from
Canadian embassies and consulates around the world, as well as the
growing analytic intelligence capability of the International Assessment
Staff (IAS) in the Privy Council Office are also essentially extralegislative, underpinned only by the royal prerogative.
The Canadian courts, for their part, like their counterparts in other
Commonwealth countries, even if they have historically been given to
judicial review of prerogative powers in matters domestic, until fairly
recently took the royal prerogative to be largely non-justiciable in most
matters strategic—particularly in relation to foreign affairs, defence and
national security. As in other Commonwealth countries, as well as in the
United States33, this presumption of non-justiciability was a function both
of a perception by the judiciary that there was functional propriety in
unfettered executive discretion in strategic matters (again, in foreign
affairs, defence and national security) and a corresponding reluctance by
that same judiciary to make decisions that, institutionally speaking, may
be beyond its ken.

threats—even if, in extremis, such intelligence is obtained from in-Canada private
conversations in respect of foreign enemies or threats—from intercept stations across the
country.
33

In the United States, the non-justiciability of executive decisions enjoys the moniker
‘political questions’—itself doubtless derivative of the British royal prerogative. In the
matter of political questions and ‘strategy’ (national security, war and peace, foreign
affairs, etc.), there is a live and intense American debate about the nature and scope of the
political questions doctrine. The protagonists in this debate include the likes of John
Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), Harold Koh, The National Security
Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990), Michael Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1990) and Thomas Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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This deference began to yield to more aggressive judicial treatment of
prerogative powers in the final quarter of the last century. By 1985, the
House of Lords, in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil
Service34, had determined that, in principle, executive action was no longer
immune from judicial review merely on account of it being carried out via
the royal prerogative, although certain prerogative powers or subjects (in
the event, national security powers in relation to the British signals
intelligence agency—the Government Communications Headquarters, or
GCHQ, effectively equivalent to Canada’s CSE) were not in and of
themselves justiciable. In the same year, the Supreme Court of Canada,
building on this House of Lords decision, levered the Charter to state
more ambitiously in Operation Dismantle35 that it could not “relinquish
justice on the basis that an issue [such as a strategic decision of
government] is inherently non-justiciable or raises so-called political
questions.” We discuss Operation Dismantle and a related line of cases
below in the context of the military, but suffice it to say at this juncture
that the decision in that case, both in its own right and given some of the
cognate cases that followed it, was, in strategic terms, more bluster than
substance. The royal prerogative in relation to defence (declaration of war
and military operations) remains largely unmolested by the judiciary, and
none of these decisions has meaningfully dented federal prerogative power
or indeed decision-making in relation to most of the key components of
diplomacy, including the making of treaties (as distinguished from their
implementation), development aid, all species of negotiation, strategic
policy planning, ambassadorial or ambassador-like appointments, as well
as the deployment of strategic national assets, including embassies and
envoys. We discuss in the next section on the military the Charter
limitation put on the prerogative in the recent Khadr36 holding, for which
the jurisprudential dust has not yet settled, but which, we must concede,
for the first time in Canadian jurisprudence, threatens to non-negligibly
clip some of the royal prerogative in relation to strategy.
34

Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374. Lord
Radcliffe stated that the exercise of the prerogative is amenable to judicial review if it
affects individual rights. This anticipated the subsequent Canadian holding in Operation
Dismantle, infra note 35.

35

Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.

36

Infra note 44.

2009]

CONSTITUTION AND STRATEGY

29

But if the ‘strategic’ royal prerogative is in Canada as yet largely whole
and untrammelled by the courts, then it is legislation and federalism that
have arguably controlled or channelled some of the broad scope of the
diplomatic prerogative. Labour Conventions oblige, federalism is a
pivotal dynamic, for instance, in the implementation of international trade
and investment agreements—even if treaty-making, strictly speaking, is
still a creature of the prerogative. (As discussed above, negotiation of
treaties is also in practice greatly affected by the federalism dynamic; in
short, the federal government can only decisively or ‘muscularly’
negotiate a treaty if it expects to be able to implement it.) As for
legislation, in addition to replacing certain prerogative aspects of
intelligence, it controls aspects of such strategic diplomatic capabilities as
economic sanctions, in particular under the federal Special Economic
Measures Act, which provides for the restriction or prohibition by the
federal government, independently of the provinces, of a catalogue of
activities or transactions between Canada, Canadian citizens and Canadian
companies with a foreign state or organization—including the freezing or
confiscation of designated foreign property in Canada—for purposes of
punishing or otherwise influencing the behaviour of that state or
organization.37
And still, jurisprudence, federalism and legislation have left wholly
unaffected a host of diplomatic capabilities underpinned by the
prerogative. These include the prerogative of the federal government to
recognize or (threaten) not to recognize foreign states and governments,
create, join or leave any number of important international councils, such
as the G-7, G-8 or now G-20 (none of which enjoys an enabling treaty),
broker international peace and security agreements, join or quit a given
military alliance or coalition, and even to recall an ambassador or expel a
foreign ambassador, envoy or official. We turn to the question of the
military instrument in the next section.
37

Canada’s sanctions regime is, strictly speaking, a function of a triad of statutes,
including the Special Economic Measures Act, the United Nations Act and the Export and
Import Permits Act. The Special Economic Measures Act is the dominant statute for
purposes of discretionary sanctions. There has to date been no jurisprudence in relation
to it. We discuss the Export and Import Permits Act in the section on natural resources
below.
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THE MILITARY
Because the royal prerogative is and remains, constitutionally
speaking, so dominant in governing Canada’s strategic military affairs,
including declarations of war and peace as well as troop deployments or
operations, the dearth of strategically meaningful jurisprudence on
sections 15, 91(7), 117 and also 118—the only sections of the 1867 Act
that explicitly reference the military instrument—is, despite the
aforementioned protestations of the late great Bora Laskin, far from
crippling to a proper constitutional understanding of the potency of
Canada’s military instrument. [To be fair, Laskin was probably seeking
simply to better understand the legislative contours of the instrument per
section 91(7). For strict strategic purposes, it is section 15, plus the more
general regal executive power in the said section 9, and, hovering above
and beyond these sections, the royal (executive) prerogative, that are most
important.] Indeed, this dearth of jurisprudence may also betray the basic
fact that Commonwealth courts have historically presumed, and to this day
for the most part continue to presume, that foreign and military matters—
questions of so-called ‘high policy’—are generally non-justiciable; that is,
they do not lend themselves to the judicial process, and that the executive
is institutionally more legitimately placed to dispose of these issues.
In Aleksic v. Canada38, for instance, the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice held that tort claims against the Government of Canada for damage
incurred during the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo
campaign were non-justiciable precisely in virtue of the fact the decision
to bomb and the targets of the bombing were purely matters of high
policy—just as would have been the historic Canadian decision to join the
NATO alliance or any military alliance, for that matter.39 However, what
38

39

Aleksic v. Canada (2002), 215 D.L.R. (4th) 720.

Even if the issue were justiciable, the Crown would be immune by virtue of the fact
that the bombing decision was one of so-called pure policy, as well as by virtue of section
8 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, which strategically immunizes the Crown
from tortious liability “in respect of anything done or omitted in the exercise of any
power or authority exercisable for the Crown, whether in time of peace or war, for the

2009]

CONSTITUTION AND STRATEGY

31

was justiciable—and the Court here built on the innovative holding almost
a decade earlier in Operation Dismantle—was subject matter that lay at
the intersection of such high policy and Charter rights; in the event, the
claims that the bombing campaign violated the plaintiffs’ section 7 (life,
liberty and security of the person) and section 15 (equality and nondiscrimination) rights. Relying on the precedent in Operation Dismantle,
discussed in greater detail immediately below, the Court dismissed the
Charter claims, with Justice Heeney declaring that “[t]o hold otherwise
would permit any citizen to, in effect, hijack Canadian foreign policy.”
In Operation Dismantle, what had been challenged was a decision by
the Canadian government to allow the testing of American cruise missiles
on Canadian territory—testing that was alleged to have been in violation
of section 7 of the Charter on the grounds, or so the argument went, that
by hosting the missiles on Canadian soil, the Government of Canada had
increased the risk of war involving Canada. Justice Wilson wrote in that
decision:
The government’s decision to allow the testing of the U.S.
cruise missiles in Canada, even although an exercise of the
royal prerogative, was reviewable by the courts under s.
32(1)(a) of the Charter. It was not insulated from review
because it was a ‘political question’ since the Court had a
constitutional obligation under s. 24 of the Charter to
decide whether any particular act of the executive violated
or threatened to violate any right of the citizen.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled in Operation Dismantle that there was
no violation of section 7 of the Charter, not least because it determined
that there must be a strong presumption that government action of a stateto-state nature that is not directed at, or that only incidentally affects, a
particular Canadian was never intended to be captured by section 7—or by
any other Charter right, for that matter. Although opening the door for
more Charter actions on strategic questions (see below), particularly those
touching individual rights, the Court’s ruling, for all practical intents and
purpose of the defence of Canada or of training, or maintaining the efficiency of, the
Canadian Forces.”
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purposes, actually concretized the dominance of the royal prerogative in
respect of the military instrument.40
Aleksic treated, somewhat parenthetically, the question of whether the
Charter applies to activities outside the territorial limits of Canada. The
Court, relying on its earlier holding in Cook41, held that, conditionally, it
did. The Cook ruling was, however, eclipsed, not uncontroversially, by
Hape42, which provided for a two-part test to determine when there was
extraterritorial applicability of the Charter: first, the conduct at issue has
to be that of a Canadian state actor caught by section 32(1)43 of the
Charter, and second, pursuant to international comity, the foreign state on
whose territory the conduct occurs has to give its consent to the
extraterritorial application of Canadian Charter or constitutional rights.
The latter could evidently be presumed to be a formidably improbable
condition, thereby reasserting the general immunity of military matters,
40

We should add that in the hypothetical event that military activity of the Canadian
government under the prerogative should be found to be in violation of a Charter right,
there is evidence to suggest that this violation would likely be saved under section 1 of
the Charter, which reads that the rights and freedoms in the Charter are “subject to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.” In obiter, in the Operation Dismantle case, Justice Wilson mused
that were the government to impose conscription for overseas service in wartime, this
would seem to be in violation of section 7 of the Charter, but would meet the reasonable
limitation in section 1. Contrariwise, she supposed, a government decision to seize
citizens for military service without enabling legislation would unequivocally violate the
Charter, under both sections 7 and 1.

41

R. v. Cook , [1998] 2 S.C.R. 957. The Supreme Court held that a Canadian citizen
questioned abroad is still entitled to Charter protection as long as the application of the
Charter does not interfere with the sovereign authority of the foreign state in question;
more precisely, as long as there is no objectionable interference with the exercise of the
foreign state’s jurisdiction.

42

43

R. v. Hape (2007), 280 D.L.R. (4th) 385.

Section 32(1) specifies that the Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament [...]; and (b) to the
legislature of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature
of the province. Section 32(1) does not provide for an explicit territorial limit on the
application of the Charter.
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and indeed the royal prerogative in relation to military matters, from
judicial control. It is highly noteworthy, therefore, that the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous recent decision, qualified this improbable
applicability of the Charter in Khadr44, stating that the Charter applied to
Canadian officials “to the extent that the conduct of Canadian officials
involved [Canada] in a process that violated Canada’s international
obligations.” This important holding, however, surely demands rapid
clarification, as it greatly muddies the erstwhile clear, prerogative-laden
marge de manoeuvre of Canadian officials acting abroad in complex
operations, the international legality of which is not always within their
control, or indeed not always decisive in Canadian calculations in respect
of where the state’s strategic interests lie. For instance, returning to
Aleksic, could one not have argued, on the logic of Khadr, that the Kosovo
war was illegal at international law (ius ad bellum), and that the
consequent activities of Canadian troops and officials in Kosovo were
contrary to the Charter? Or that Canadian intelligence agents collecting
information on threats emerging from Iraq during the arguably illegal war
in Iraq (also in terms of ius ad bellum) might be at risk of acting in
contravention of the Charter? Affirmative answers to these counterfactual
queries would surely be tantamount to meaningfully circumscribing some
of the strategic potency of Canada’s military and diplomatic instruments in
the world.
The recent Amnesty International45decision, issued prior to Khadr and
thus relying on Hape, affirmed that the Charter did not apply to the
conduct of Canadian Forces personnel in detaining or transferring Afghan
44

Canada v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28. The Supreme Court found that section 7 of the
Charter, relating to “fundamental justice,” was engaged in this case, thereby imposing “a
duty on Canada to provide disclosure of materials in its possession arising from its
participation in the foreign process [i.e. the questioning of Omar Khadr at Guantanamo
Bay] that is contrary to international law and jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian
citizen.” This important determination was in fact somewhat anticipated by Justice
LeBel’s reasons for the plurality in Hape, where he noted at paragraph 101: “I would
leave open the possibility that, in a future case, participation by Canadian [state actors] in
activities in another country that would violate Canada’s international human rights
obligations might justify a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter [...].”

45

Amnesty International v. Canada, 2008 F.C. 336.
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detainees; that is, even though the Forces were clearly Canadian state
actors, the application of Canadian constitutional rights to their detainees
was not consented to by the Afghan government. So while the question,
which lay at the intersection of the prerogative and a claimed
constitutional right, was easily justiciable, this mattered little in practice,
as the effective marge de manoeuvre of the Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan was unaffected by the decision.46 This decision is now being
appealed before the Federal Court of Appeal, and the decision in this
appeal will surely consider Khadr. En attendant, it must be posited,
although perhaps controversially, that Charter considerations, as a general
rule, continue to matter little in strategic decision-making by the military
in Canada. Khadr notwithstanding, the Charter, in other words, is for the
time being not a very material bar to Canadian strategic power, as
manifested by the military, at least outside Canadian borders.
Of course, as already established, in addition to the courts interpreting
or controlling, through the common law, the scope of the prerogative in
strategic matters, legislation may also clip or eclipse the prerogative. The
National Defence Act, for instance, governs, on the strength of the federal
militia power in section 91(7) of the 1867 Act, the conduct of the
Canadian Forces and the administration of the Department of National
Defence. And to the extent that the provisions of the Act speak explicitly
or by necessary implication to matters otherwise coming under the
purview of the royal prerogative, the legislative provisions, under the
constitutional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, trump the prerogative.
Notably, section 31 of the Act provides for “active service” designation by
the Governor in Council (the executive or government), which may seem
46

In Amnesty International, Justice Mactavish, in obiter, suggested that there remains
some uncertainty in respect of the possibility that the military, because of its coercive
character, might require a sui generis test for extraterritorial application of the Charter.
In this respect, Mactavish tracks the important British holding in Al-Skeini et al. v.
Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, in which it was determined that the UK
Human Rights Act, 1998, which effectively implemented into British domestic law the
European Convention on Human Rights, did apply to British public authorities—in the
event, the British military—to the narrow extent that they exercised effective control on
foreign territory through military detention facilities, as with embassies and consulates,
operating on the consent of the Iraqi government. Strangely, Al-Skeini is not at all
referenced in Amnesty International or in the cognate Canadian jurisprudence in Cook,
Hape or Khadr.
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to muddy the waters of the historically untouchable royal prerogative in
respect of troop deployments. In practice, however, it seems that, at least
for the time being, this provision has not generally been viewed or treated
as a statutory rule in respect of deployment of the Canadian Forces.47
In the meantime, section 32 of the Act states that “Whenever the
Governor in Council places the Canadian Forces or any component or unit
thereof on active service, if Parliament is then separated by an
adjournment or prorogation that will not expire within ten days, a
proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten days,
and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit on the day appointed by the
proclamation, and shall continue to sit and act in like manner as if it had
stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.” This provision clearly
adds a perfunctory measure of legislated Parliamentary involvement in at
least the discussion of military matters, broadly put, at the expense of the
royal prerogative. However, this means that Parliament is only strictly
required to meet and sit after a given declaration of war or troop
deployment and, given the absence of specific language to that effect,
without a legal mandate for scrutiny, let alone control, of strategic or
tactical operations of the Forces. Moreover, considering that the weight of
the evidence continues to suggest that there is no constitutional
requirement for Parliament to debate or vote, ex ante, on Canadian
declarations of war of troop deployments, the prerogative for the military
instrument clearly emerges unmolested—in strategic terms, at least.48
47

Craig Forcese, National Security Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2008), p. 154. See,
however, the dissent in Aleksic, supra note 38, by Justice Wright, suggesting that the
active service provision in the National Defence Act should now be seen as having
replaced the royal prerogative for military deployments.

48

See the idiosyncratic piece by Ikechi Mgbeoji who, although searching long and hard
through Hansard records for such a constitutional requirement for parliamentary
oversight or debate on international troop deployments, concedes that no such
requirement exists in Canadian law. (However, there may be evidence of a vague or
indeed very embryonic constitutional convention in this respect, with which, one could
add, the interest of the last and current Conservative governments in parliamentary voting
on treaties, declarations of war and peace, as well as troop deployments, is ostensibly
consistent.) He does, however, suggest that while “the Crown prerogative on matters of
war remains intact, albeit with some modicum of judicial inroads,” (p. 183),
jurisprudence around this prerogative remains unclear, and some statutes, such as the
National Defence Act, may have laid the groundwork for future judicial inroads into the
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Provincial considerations do not figure prominently or obviously in
most elements of the strategic military instrument. They are important,
however, in respect of various permutations of Canadian military
deployment or so-called ‘call-out’ on Canadian soil. Classically, the
Canadian Forces may be called out in aid of the civil power, which is
governed by Part VI of the National Defence Act. This aid of the civil
power involves the prevention or suppression of an anticipated or actual
riot or disturbance of the peace that is deemed by the relevant provincial
attorney general as exceeding the capabilities of provincial civilian
authorities. This call-out may be requisitioned in writing by the relevant
provincial attorney general, following which, according to section 283 of
the Act, “[t]he Canadian Forces or any part thereof called out in aid of the
civil power shall remain on duty, in such strength as the Chief of the
Defence Staff or such officer as the Defence Staff may designate deems
necessary or orders, until notification that the Canadian Forces are no
longer required in aid of the civil power is received from the attorney
general of the province concerned and, from time to time as in the opinion
of the Chief of the Defence Staff the exigencies of the situation require,
the Chief of the Defence Staff may increase or diminish the number of
officers or non-commissioned members called out.”
The federal government may equally trigger the domestic deployment
of Canadian Forces without the provinces. This includes the ill-defined
“public service” deployments under the National Defence Act in respect of
a law enforcement matter that, according to section 273.6(2) of the Act, (a)
is in the national interest (a term of art evidently undefined in the
legislation, and therefore subject to executive discretion), and (b) cannot
be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the Canadian

prerogative. [Ikechi Mgbeoji, “Prophylactic Use of Force in International Law: The
Illegitimacy of Canada’s Participation in ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ Without United
Nations Authorization and Parliamentary Sanction” (2003) 8:2 Rev. Const. Stud. 170.] It
is also somewhat noteworthy that the National Defence Act, at a largely sub-strategic
level, replaces the Criminal Code of Canada in respect of military justice and discipline
as these concern members of the Canadian Forces both at home and abroad. In either
scenario, federal legislative supremacy—whether under the militia or criminal law
power—remains unaffected.
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Forces.49 More fundamentally, however—and this gets to the core of the
federal state’s constitutional capabilities in respect of strategic domestic
deployment—, any threat or emergency (or indeed attack) emanating
from, or materially related to, foreign states or parties could (and likely
would, depending on its assessed scale) be addressed under the
Emergencies Act (not the aid of the civil power provisions), including
through the declaration of a public order, international or war
emergency—again, depending on the details of the matter at hand. The
Emergencies Act, which we take up in the next section, triggers a host of
potent government capabilities and assets, including the military
instrument. Moreover, as we argue below, the entirety of the ambit of this
military instrument afforded by the royal prerogative in the context of
strategic emergencies—domestic or international—is not exhausted or
replaced by this Act.
The provinces also loom large in respect of section 117 of the 1867
Act, which states that “[t]he several Provinces shall retain all their
respective Public Property not otherwise disposed of in this Act, subject to
the Right of Canada to assume any Lands or Public Property required for
Fortifications or for the Defence of the Country.” This is a powerful
expropriation provision for the federal government, affirmed most recently
in the Human Rights Institute ruling50 in 2000, which upheld the
Government of Canada’s right to expropriate land from British Columbia
for purposes of continuing a torpedo testing arrangement with the United
States near Nanoose Bay. While section 117 is an executive power (not a
legislative power), its strategic force is similar to that of the non-military
49

Forcese, supra note 47 at pp. 168-170, observes that two federal orders-in-coucil were
issued in the 1990s, pursuant to the royal prerogative, in relation to domestic deployment
of the Canadian Forces solely on the initiative or approval of the federal government: the
first, the Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions (P.C. 1996833), addresses federal military assistance to provincial law enforcement agencies; the
second, the Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions (P.C. 1993-624), addresses
the deployment of Canadian special forces assets. Both orders-in-council address
disturbances of the peace, likely or actual, deemed of national interest. Notes Forcese at
p. 170: “Out of an abundance of caution, […], the preferable approach is to treat the
order-in-council provisions as procedures governing the application of the [National
Defence Act] public service powers to the particular circumstances to which they relate.”
50

Human Rights Institute of Canada v. Canada, [2000] 1 F.C. 475.
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declaratory power (a legislative provision) in the 1867 Act’s section
92(10)(c), which we discuss in the next section, and it overcomes the
general presumption of provincial land (and resource) ownership outlined
in section 109. To be sure, of course, the Government of Canada may
enact laws under section 91(7), the militia power, that have the very same
effect as section 117.51
Section 109 is in fact a key strategic section for purposes of the natural
resource factor of power, which we examine two sections hence. Along
with national economic capacity and population, both also discussed in
upcoming sections, the natural resources factor greatly influences
Canada’s military instrument (and indeed the diplomatic instrument)
through avenues that are generally indirect. And, of course, these factors
of power are greatly complicated by the federalism dynamic, which means
that the strategic military instrument, while prima facie dominated by the
federal executive, is in reality undergirded by highly nuanced federalprovincial constitutional dynamics.

GOVERNMENT, OR PURE EXECUTIVE POTENCY
If the strategic capacity of the Canadian state, constitutionally
speaking, is significant in the purest terms of its diplomatic and military
instruments—and this, let us recall, in spite of the astrategic design and
strategically indifferent interpretation of the Constitution—then these
instruments are only buttressed, as a rule, by other ‘subsidiary’ strategic
elements of the Constitution having strategic import. Perhaps the most
important of these subsidiary strategic elements is the general potency,
flexibility or efficiency, broadly conceived, of the federal executive. (Let
us recall that in Canadian constitutional law, executive power follows the
grant of legislative power. And, as mentioned above, given the frequent
identity between the executive and legislative branches in the context of
majority governments in Westminster systems—party discipline oblige—,
51

Gérard La Forest, infra note 79 at p. 155, affirms this on the strength of the 1874
holding in L’Union St. Jacques de Montréal v. Bélisle (1874), 6 P.C. 31. The age of the
case likely speaks less to the import of the ruling itself than to the aforementioned patent
penury of cases on the strategically important militia power.
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a given federal legislative power should more often than not be seen as
indicative of a concomitant executive power. The reverse is evidently
often not true.)
The emergency powers or capabilities of the federal Parliament (by
implication, the federal executive) are perhaps the most obvious
manifestation of the link between pure executive potency and strategic
power. On this matter, the remarks of Craig Forcese are instructive:
There will […] be threats so far in excess of the normal
state of and so immediate that the state will treat them as
emergencies. Such a state of emergency may change the
institutional structure within which […] law operates. […]
[D]emocracies are built on a system of checks and balances
that constrain the exercise of power. Yet, emergencies
often, if not usually, require the exercise of power.
Moreover, this power must be implemented swiftly and
with resolution. While law applicable in normal situations
diffuses power, emergencies concentrate it.52
Historically, the general or residuary power to make laws for the peace,
order and good government (POGG) of Canada under section 91 in the
1867 Act has provided the most apparent constitutional underpinning for
federal legislation and actions in cases of emergencies, including war or
threats of war.53 This broad emergency power (or, technically, the
emergency branch of the POGG power), invoked by the federal
government in proclaiming the War Measures Act in the 1970 October
Crisis, has since arguably been discliplined to a great extent by legislation
in the form of the Emergencies Act, 1988. (The War Measures Act was
repealed in 1988.) The Emergencies Act defines “national emergency” in
section 3 as “an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that (a)
seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such
proportions as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal
52

53

Forcese, supra note 47.

The leading case in this regard is Reference Re. Anti-Inflation Act, 1975, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 373.
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with it, or (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada
to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada.”
This definition makes clear that certain temporary—although prima facie
sweeping—executive emergency measures are essential, in certain
situations, to restore the capacity of the government to pursue strategic
interests—in the event, described as sovereignty, security and territorial
integrity. These measures (“orders and regulations”), depending on the
nature of the declared emergency, include everything from prohibitions on
travel to requisition or seizure of property, control of specified industries
and removal from Canada of non-citizens. [Some of the Act’s orders and
regulations clearly coincide with the federal quarantine power under
section 91(11) of the 1867 Act. The limits of this power have not to date
been properly established by the jurisprudence, even if the Canadian
SARS emergency of 2003 gave it new strategic relevance.] The Act
proposes four possible categories of national emergency, each of them
with a certain strategic import: public welfare, public order, international
or war, respectively with (renewable) expiry dates of ninety, thirty, sixty
and one hundred and twenty days. Moreover, the Act requires nonbinding “consultation” between the federal executive and affected
provinces prior to a declaration, on “reasonable grounds,” by the former of
a national emergency under the auspices of the Act, as well as ex-post
parliamentary supervision of the declaration and associated temporary
special measures taken by the executive to deal with the emergency.
(Tracking the logic of the federal defence aid of the civil power
provisions, the federal government may not, in the case of a public welfare
or public order emergency where the direct effects of the emergency are
confined to, or occur mainly in, a single province, declare an emergency in
the absence of affirmation from the lieutenant-governor of the concerned
province that management of the matter at hand exceeds the capabilities of
the province.) Parliament has, in a similar vein, the authority to revoke a
declaration of emergency. Federalism oblige, the Act states that federal
orders and regulations made under its auspices may not “unduly impair the
ability of any province to take measures [...] for dealing with an
emergency in the province” or, in respect of command and control, that
nothing in the Act should be construed or applied “so as to derogate from
[...] the control or direction of the government of a province or
municipality over any police force over which it normally has control or
direction.”
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As the Act has never to date been invoked by the federal government to
deal with an emergency, we do not yet know the extent to which it in
practice circumscribes, or indeed channels, executive power under the
emergency branch of the POGG power in dealing with patently strategic
issues like military or national security threats. Some have suggested that
while, in practice, “Parliament’s constitutional authority to respond to
emergencies cannot be defined by, or made to conform to, the terms of an
ordinary statute, the definitions of emergencies found in the Emergencies
Act would surely be relevant in any future constitutional litigation
involving use of the emergency branch of POGG.”54 This would seem to
suggest that any litigation on an emergency—naturally slow off the
mark—would typically occur after the response of Parliament (or
government) to the emergency, swiftness of executive response oblige,
and as such would have limited opportunity to circumscribe, in real-time,
the emergency response of government—thereby requiring government
instead to justify its response ex post. Nonetheless, as is often the case,
and depending on the gravity of the strategic emergency in question, it is
conceivable, if not probable, that the government’s response would be
conditioned in part by such expected litigation, thereby affirming
somewhat the controlling power of the legislation. (Of course, it bears
mentioning that the Emergencies Act is, as with all statutes, and as is
explicitly mentioned in its preamble, constitutionally controlled the
Charter. Moreover, it may be offered that the very fact that the Act does
not in and of itself provide for any derogation whatever from the Charter
in some sense makes it fairly tame emergency legislation.)
For all practical intents and purposes, of course, legislation is, after all,
only legislation. It may be so significant as to be quasi-constitutional on a
broad conception of the Constitution, but it is not strictly constitutional in
status. As such, one could reasonable argue that the gap between what is
strictly permitted in or by the Emergencies Act and what is constitutionally
permissible is identifiable with an emergency (royal) prerogative enjoying
constitutional status. This prerogative hovers over and above of the
Emergencies Act, and is supported by cases such as Burmah Oil Co. v.
Lord Advocate55, affirming the constitutional right of the executive to
54

Patrick Monahan, supra note 13, p. 257.

55

Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75.
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defend the sovereignty of the country. Suresh, on perhaps a more micro
level, referring as it does to “extraordinary circumstances” (yet to be
defined), also intimates the existence of such a prerogative.56 And this
emergency prerogative could effectively be viewed as embodying the
contested doctrine of constitutional necessity, affirmed in Re Manitoba
Language Rights57, where necessity is occasioned by extraordinary
strategic circumstances (such as an overwhelming military or terrorist
threat or attack, or in the Manitoba Language Rights case, a massive legal
vacuum) requiring extraordinary or even ordinarily ‘illegal’ measures to
protect or preserve the state. Such extraordinary measures would be
strictly within the Canadian constitutional framework, with the “principle
of necessity [viewed] either as an autonomous source of law or as a metarule of constitutional construction.”58 In short, the necessity doctrine
confirms that the Canadian Constitution cannot, in exceptional
circumstances or emergencies, properly or reasonably be viewed as a
‘death pact,’ as it were, for the state and its citizens.
56

Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. At paragraph 78, the Court stated: “We do not
exclude the possibility that in exceptional circumstances, deportation [under the then
Immigration Act] to face torture might be justified either as a consequence of the
balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the Charter or under s. 1.” The Court goes on to
say that a violation of s. 7 will be saved by s. 1 “only in cases arising out of exceptional
conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the like.” This
last bit seems to speak to the existence in Canadian constitutional law of the doctrine of
necessity, discussed in the next note (57).
57

Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721. Said the Court in the unanimous
judgment: “Necessity in the context of governmental action provides a justification for
otherwise illegal conduct of a government during a public emergency. In order to ensure
rule of law, the Courts will recognize as valid the constitutionally invalid Acts of the
[Manitoba] Legislature.” In the event, these constitutionally invalid laws were ones that
had not been translated into French.

58

Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in
Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 46-47.
For an interesting normative treatment of necessity, see David Dyzenhaus, The
Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). Strictly speaking, the ruling in the Manitoba Language Rights
Reference, supra note 57, affirms the doctrine of necessity not as a proper principle of the
Canadian Constitution, but rather as subservient to the constitutional principle of the rule
of law.
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At a strictly constitutional level, therefore, we again have the character
and scope of pure Canadian strategic power—in this case, executive
potency as manifested in emergencies—being most meaningfully defined
at the intersection of the royal (emergency) prerogative and Charter rights.
This dynamic is complicated, though, by the fact that the Charter has
nothing explicit to say regarding emergencies per se. It does, as we know,
provide in section 4(2) that “[i]n time of real or apprehended war, invasion
or insurrection, a House of Commons may be continued by Parliament and
a legislative assembly may be continued beyond five years if such
continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the
members of the House of Commons or the legislative assembly, as the
case may be.”59 Naturally, there having been no “apprehended war,
invasion or insurrection” in Canada from well before the advent of the
Charter, this provision has neither been invoked by the executive nor
treated in the jurisprudence. We do know, however, that it provides, if
necessary, for legitimate constitutional extension of executive power in
times of strategic import. Again, this speaks to strategic power as
capacity, not exercise, as such a move would doubtless prove politically
contentious and, as with declarations of emergency under the Emergencies
Act, could well be subject to judicial action after the fact.60
59

This provision, in 1982, replaced virtually identical language, now repealed, in part of
section 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Interestingly, section 91(1) had been added
to the Constitution in 1949, a time at which the Government of Canada would clearly
have had strategy, in one form or other, on its mind.

60

Back in 1985, J.R. Mallory wrote: “The first provision [of the Constitution Act, 1982,
that may give rise to constitutional challenges on procedural grounds] is subsection 4(2)
[...]. This is clearly a case where a court might have to inquire what Parliament actually
was for this purpose.” [J.R. Mallory, “Beyond ‘Manner and Form’: Reading Between the
Lines in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R.” (1985) 31 McGill L.J. 480. Forcese, supra note
47, observes that it is not at all clear how and with what degree of activism s. 4(2) would
be policed by the courts. Would, for instance, courts review, or be capable of
meaningfully reviewing, the alleged existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or
insurrection? He is also inclined to believe, as I noted above, that courts could well be
disposed to save breaches of a number of Charter sections, section 7 in particular, under
section 1. Drawing, therefore, on the holding in Re. Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150, Forcese
hints here at an eventual, constitutionally required role for Parliament in checking
executive emergency activities, noting at p. 120 that “a Parliament tempted to delegate
indefinitely its full plenary powers, perhaps in response to an emergency, would [...] run
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The Charter also has a powerful notwithstanding clause (section 33)
providing for the operation of laws by either the federal Parliament or
provincial legislatures notwithstanding certain sections of the Charter.
This clause has not to date been invoked by any federal government, and
would not be operative on the ‘democratic rights’ in sections 3, 4 and 5, as
well as the “mobility rights,” discussed later in this piece, in section 6.
However, in the event of an emergency, national security or military
event, the federal government would have available to it, under the
notwithstanding clause, the capacity to override the Charter “legal rights”
in sections 7 to 14, as well as the equality provision in section 15. (No
justification for such an override would have to be provided under section
1, as that section would also be overridden by section 33.) It is also not
inconceivable, depending on the gravity of the circumstances, that a
government, confronted with a “real or apprehended war, invasion or
insurrection,” could invoke both the notwithstanding clause and section
4(2), which would be tantamount to a fairly potent cocktail of executive
override of most of the Charter’s key rights provisions.61
It behooves us to note, furthermore, that the POGG power has at least
one additional ‘branch’ or dimension, outside of the said emergency
branch, that has strategic import. The ‘national concern’ branch62 is
seldom used by government and still not very clearly or persuasively
defined in the jurisprudence. It is also approached by the courts with
considerable reticence, preoccupied as has been Canadian jurisprudence
afoul of a long-established pre-Charter constitutional restriction barring complete
abdication of Parliament’s responsibility in favour of the executive.”
61

Of the first fifteen Charter rights, considered the key bulwark of Canada’s
constitutionalized fundamental rights and freedoms, only sections 5 (that Parliament will
sit at least once every twelve months) and 6 (mobility rights) would effectively be saved
under this cocktail. Sections 3 (that every citizen has the right to vote in an election) and
4(1) (that no House of Commons will continue for more than five years) would become
moot upon the invocation of section 4(2).

62

Some scholars, such as Monahan, have pointed to a fourth possible—although
embryonic—branch of the POGG power relating to interprovincial concerns or matters of
interprovincial significance.
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over most of the country’s constitutional history with the POGG power
either as a residual or emergency power. Still, one can presume the
emergence of certain new strategic matters (not emergencies)
characterized by “a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility.”63 These
matters would not have existed or been anticipated at the time of
Confederation, or would over time have become a national concern (and
therefore would fall under federal jurisdiction), even if originally under
provincial jurisdiction. Such new strategic matters could eventually
expand the strategic jurisdiction and therefore power of the federal
government. Ostensibly strategic matters like nuclear energy have in the
not too distant past been justified as falling under federal jurisdiction on
the basis of this national concern branch.64 Indeed, the strategic import of
uranium was recognized by the federal government immediately after the
explosion of the first atomic bombs toward the end of the Second World
War; the Government of Canada availed itself of the highly potent yet
little known declaratory power in section 92(10)(c) of the 1867 Act,
which provides that the federal Parliament may declare certain local works
or undertakings, although wholly situated within or otherwise falling
under the jurisdiction of a province, as for the “general advantage of
Canada.” Such a declaration would mean that the declared ‘work’ (that is,
the work declared in legislation) would immediately fall under federal
jurisdiction.
This declaratory power has been used nearly five hundred times since
Confederation, in particular in the transportation industry, and especially
in respect of the once highly strategic (and still arguably somewhat
63

See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1. S.C.R. 401. See the critical
counterpoint by Brun and Tremblay, supra note 24 at pp. 556-557, in which they wrily
note: « Inutile de dire qu’il n’existe pas dans la jurisprudence de préoccupation
correspondante de transférer aux provinces les matières, dont les exemples ne manquent
pas, qui étaient à l’origine d’intérêt national et qui sont devenues de nature purement
locale et privée. »
64

Ontario Hydro v. Ontario, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327. Of course, given the security and
military considerations associated with nuclear energy, including the need for energy
production and secure nuclear energy sites in the event of war or insurrection, and given
the magnificent size of Canada’s uranium reserves and exports, it stands to reason that
this was a strategic coup for the federal government.
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strategic) rail sector, but also in respect of telecommunications and labour
strikes of national significance. A declaration by Parliament is dispositive,
meaning that courts will not enquire into whether the ‘work’—say, a
uranium mine—in question, provided it relates to something physical,
material or tangible, is actually for the general advantage of Canada.65
Signally, when the federal government declared atomic energy for the
general advantage of Canada in 1946, it also enacted the Atomic Energy
Control Act. As this legislation was contested, because of traditional
provincial dominance in the area of natural resources (to which we next
turn), the immediate use of the declaratory power by the federal
Parliament effectively eliminated any uncertainty as to the legitimacy of
the legislation and federal jurisdiction until such time as the Supreme
Court, many years later, in the 1993 Ontario Hydro case66, could confirm
the statute on the basis of the national concern branch of the POGG
power.67
Finally, and critically, Canadian strategic potency is doubtless
buttressed by the conspicuous fact that the criminal law power resides with
65

See Jorgenson v. Canada, [1971] S.C.R. 725. Contrast this holding with that in the
famous 1952 U.S. Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a seizure by the President (the federal
executive branch) of a steel mill—strategically important for purposes of military
production during the 1950-53 Korean war—was unconstitutional, as it was contrary to
the separation of powers doctrine requiring that legislation in respect of such a seizure sit
with Congress (the legislative branch).

66

67

Supra note 64.

Monahan, supra note 13, p. 371. For an expansive and indeed critical treatment of the
declaratory power, see Andrée Lajoie, Le pouvoir déclaratoire du Parlement:
Augmentation discrétionnaire de la competence fédérale du Canada (Montréal: Les
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1969). Exotically, Lajoie proposes at the end of his
book that the fact that 7/8 of the uses to date of the declaratory power have related to the
rail sector betrays a conspiracy by Macdonald at Confederation not to explicitly regulate
intraprovincial railways in the formal division of powers of the 1867 Act, but rather
through the insertion of the prima facie innocuous and inconspicuous section 92(10)(c).
Strategy! Writes Lajoie at p. 112: « Ce n’est pas impossible si l’on considère la structure
économique du Canada à la fin du XIXe siècle, de ce pays où des centaines de
compagnies ont construit chacune une parcelle de ce qui n’allait devenir un réseau à
l’échelle canadienne que beaucoup plus tard. »
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the federal government. Section 91(27) of the 1867 Act states that the
federal government has responsibility for “[t]he Criminal Law, except the
Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the
Procedure in Criminal Matters.” [The administration and enforcement of
justice, for its part, including the establishment and maintenance of
provincial police forces and courts, lie with the provinces under section
91(14).] This federal criminal law power has, in general, been interpreted
broadly by the courts, which have distilled three baseline factors that must
generally underpin legitimate criminal laws—to wit, the existence of a
prohibition on a given activity, the existence of an associated penalty and,
lastly, that the legislation in question must serve a criminal public purpose,
such as “peace, order, security, health, morality.”68 (Contrast this with
Australian and American constitutional treatment of criminal law, where
substantive criminal law resides largely with the states, requiring
considerable coordination of criminal law-making across the jurisdictions
in the former case, and resulting in significant inconsistencies in
substantive criminal law across the jurisdictions in the latter case.) Indeed,
the criminal law power may ostensibly be used by the federal government
to enact legislation relating to a large number of activities—economic
activities, especially—that would typically have fallen under the
provincial property and civil rights power when weighed against federal
powers like the POGG and trade and commerce powers.
For our purposes, it is instructive that the broad federal criminal law
power has strategic import in the peculiar context of Canadian national
security. As a strategic concept, national security refers to the protection
or critical Canadian assets and interests against a variety of threats,
domestic and international, human and natural, deliberate and accidental—
a state of affairs that lies somewhere between the spheres of personal
safety and international security.69 And on this conceptualization, national
security can be said to have strategic import to the extent that it involves
protection of critical Canadian assets and interests specifically against
68

Justice Rand in Reference Re Validity of section 5(a) of Dairy Industry Act (Canada),
[1949] S.C.R. 1.

69

See Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Ottawa: Privy
Council Office, 2004), p. 4
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foreign or foreign-related threats, whether manifested in Canada proper or
abroad. Protection against these threats may well be provided in part by
the diplomatic and military instruments of the state, but in general terms, it
stands to reason that the provision of this national security, as a function of
the executive potency factor, should be seen as a supporting (in some
cases, ‘defensive’) condition for the proper functioning of these two
instruments. At the federal level, the term national security or one of its
cognates appears in at least thirty statutes, with less than a third of these
attempting—with great difficulty—to define the term.70 Taken together,
statutes like the Emergencies Act, Emergency Management Act, CSIS
Act71, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Act, Security of
Information Act (formerly the Official Secrets Act), Canada Evidence Act,
Citizenship Act, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act72, Aeronautics
70

Forcese, supra note 47, p. 8.

71

The CSIS Act is likely based on the federal POGG power or the defence power in
section 91(7), based on the holding in Attorney-General (Quebec) v. Keable v. AttorneyGeneral (Canada), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 218. This holding concerned the activities of the
precursor to CSIS, the RCMP’s Security Service. (One could reasonably suppose that the
POGG head of power, in point of fact, is far more plausible than the defence power as a
support for the Act, given that the Act deals only parenthetically with defence interests.)
More interestingly, one wonders why the provinces do not erect intelligence services of
their own. Why, for instance, does Quebec, while profiting from the Sûreté du Québec
(the provincial police force) under section 92(14) of the 1867 Act, not create its own
version CSIS? Indeed, this was one of the prospective (‘strategic’) practical-cum-policy
challenges or ‘to do’s’ envisioned by the sovereigntist camp on the eve of the 1995
referendum on Quebec secession in the event of accession to proper statehood.
Constitutionally speaking, the answer is relatively straightforward: Provincial spending
power aside (which we take up in the section below on national economic might), the
“within the province” limitation of section 92 (which also exists in sections 92A, 93 and
95) of the 1867 Act effectively limits the policing-cum-security activities of the provinces
to their respective territory.
72

A prominent national security process found in the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act is the security certificate, which provides for detention and deportation of
foreign nationals and permanent residents deemed to constitute a threat to the security of
Canada. These provisions were ruled unconstitutional (variously contrary to sections 7, 9
and 10(c) of the Charter, and not saved by section 1) in Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007]
S.C.J. No. 9. The declaration nullifying the certificate regime was suspended for one
year. The federal government reenacted amended provisions in 2007, creating, inter alia,
an amicus curiae regime for those detained under a security certificate.
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Act, Canadian Transportation Act and indeed, inter alia, the National
Defence Act make up the nucleus of Canada’s national security legislative
framework. And for all practical intents and purposes, the leading
strategic assets or agencies of the Canadian state in the national security
sphere are the RCMP and CSIS. The former exists on the basis of the
RCMP Act and the latter on the basis of the CSIS Act. However, national
security, especially given its troubled susceptibility to precise legal
definition,73 is in many important respects given constitutional salience
and expression by federal criminal law. As such, a number of provisions
of the Criminal Code of Canada are highly strategic. For instance, the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 amended the Criminal Code to define
terrorism and created several offences related to terrorism (with significant
extraterritorial effect), including terrorism financing and participation in,
facilitation and execution of terrorist acts.74 The Act also provided, among
other things, for the seizure and forfeiture of property within Canada
belonging to terrorist groups.
Provisions related to two of the pivotal criminal law processes enacted
in the Anti-Terrorism Act—so-called investigative hearings and
recognizance with conditions, including preventive arrests in the context
of potential terrorist acts—sunsetted in 2006. The federal government
attempted to reinstate these provisions, without substantial amendment, in
2007 via Bill S-3. This bill was passed by the Senate, but was at second
73

See the exceptional effort by the Supreme Court to delimit “national security” in
Suresh, supra note 56, in which the Supreme Court, referring to the then Immigration
Act, stated with affirmation: “We reject the arguments that the terms ‘danger to the
security of Canada’ and ‘terrorism’ are unconstitutionally vague.” Compare this with
note 74 below.

74

In R. v. Khawaja, [2006] O.J. No. 4245, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found
that the motive clause in the definition of terrorism contained in the Anti-Terrorism Act,
which related to an act or omission “in whole or in part for a political, religious or
ideological purpose, objective or cause”, was unconstitutional, as contrary to section 2 of
the Charter (freedoms of conscience, religion, thought, belief, expression and
association) and not saved by section 1. Note also that, unlike the majority of Canadian
laws, as with the terrorism provisions, the Criminal Code has a number of provisions
with extraterritorial effect (e.g. hijacking, passport forgery, piracy and bigamy). The
Security of Information Act, notably, has extraterritorial effect, in de facto ‘criminal law’
terms, in respect of the offence of espionage.
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reading in the House of Commons when it recessed in June 2008. An
election was called in September 2008, and the bill has not been reintroduced at this time of writing.
Of course, we have already discussed the powerful executive
expropriation power, for military purposes, in section 117 of the 1867 Act.
We discuss the federal government’s general expropriation powers in the
next section on natural resources.

NATURAL RESOURCES (AND FOOD)
There is an intimate strategic relationship between the geographic
element or factor of power—not explored per se in this piece because
excessively abstract—and the less abstract natural resources factor. 75
75

Of pure geography, abstraction oblige, and apart from the necessary delineation of
physical (provincial, territorial and national) borders, there is precious little explicit
language in the written Constitution. Having conceded this in principle, however, the
Constitution is implicitly and doctrinally rich on the subject. One reasonable proxy for
geographic power is the notion of territorial integrity or territorial sovereignty.
Commenting tangentially, for instance, on the issue of offshore minerals, where the
Supreme Court, in the B.C. Offshore Reference, [1967] S.C.R. 792, consistent with
treatment of this matter in Australia and the United States, confirmed federal legislative
jurisdiction and ownership rights over the territorial sea and federal legislative
jurisdiction and exploitation rights over the continental shelf, Peter Hogg writes: “Where
the Constitution Act, 1867 is not explicit on the status of offshore resources, it is
noteworthy that all these powers affecting external sovereignty [emphasis added] that are
mentioned [in the 1867 Act] are, without exception, confided to the federal Parliament.
These include trade and commerce [s. 92(2)], military and naval service and defence [s.
91(7)], beacons, buoys, lighthouses and Sable Island [s. 91(9)], navigation and shipping
[s. 91(10)], and other major offshore resources, namely, seacoast fisheries [s. 91(12)]. In
all these matters, the Constitution Act, 1867 recognizes that once the low-water mark is
passed, the international domain is reached. For domestic constitutional purposes, as well
as for international law purposes, the actor in that domain is the federal government, not
the provinces. [Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto:
Carswell), c. 30-10.] We might add that where the written Constitution and the courts are
otherwise silent on the question of territorial sovereignty, the royal prerogative is in full
effect, relating as it does to “the whole catalogue of relations [of the Crown] with foreign
nations [including] sovereignty over land, sea, and air.” [F.A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in
English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.]
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Canada’s physical geography not only provides a physical or spatial (and
indeed psychological) barrier and buffer against conventional military or
national security threats (so-called ‘strategic depth’), and arguably a
secure base for the prosecution of military campaigns abroad, but it is also
a source of the many natural resources or raw materials that drive the
country’s industrial capacity. In addition, this land mass informs Canada’s
human holding capacity, which in turn feeds the national industrial
capacity and provides direct manpower or talent for the diplomatic and
military instruments that directly project Canadian strategic power. We
discuss industrial capacity and population as factors of power, as reflected
in the Constitution, in our final two sections below. For now, let us
offer—indeed repeat—that what is most salient in analyzing the
constitutional treatment of these factors of power, as well as natural
resources, is not only the raw potential magnitude of the power in question
(bearing in mind the distinction between theoretical constitutional
potential and policy-political praxis), but also, critically, the extent to
which this power may be mobilized for strategic purposes—or more
readily, in the service of one or both of the state’s diplomatic and military
instruments.
Natural resources, in respect of which Canada has been called an
apparent “superpower,”76 are critical to Canadian strategic power in at
least three key respects. First and foremost, there is the need for adequate
and secure supply of such resources for the Canadian population and the
Canadian state—particularly its military and diplomatic instruments.
Secure access to non-renewable resources like oil and gas, coal and
uranium is evidently essential, to take but an obvious example, for
purposes of energy production and consumption (and export), while access
to renewable resources like forestry products is critical to construction,
both for the general economy (a factor of strategic power) and for military
purposes. Note the intervention by Hans Morgenthau in this respect,
writing at the height of the Cold War:

76

Prime Minister Harper’s speech of July 14, 2007, in the United Kingdom:
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060715/g8_harper_060715?s_
name=&no_ads=
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With the increasing mechanization of warfare, which since
the industrial revolution has proceeded at a faster pace than
in all preceding history, national power has become more
and more dependent upon the control of raw materials in
peace and war. It is not by accident that the two most
powerful nations today, the United States and the Soviet
Union, come closest to being self-sufficient in the raw
materials necessary for modern industrial production, and
control at least the access to the sources of those raw
materials which they do not themselves produce.77
Similarly, food supply, on which we touch only very superficially in this
paper, is also strategically relevant in the basic sense that an adequate,
secure supply of such is critical to the survival of the population and the
associated viability of the state’s basic strategic instruments. Second,
natural resources, if properly (some might say ruthlessly) levered, could in
certain strategic scenarios be used as a national ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ to
advance Canadian interests. Targeted or earmarked export of certain
resources, such as oil and gas, could arguably be exchanged for, or, in the
diplomatic parlance, ‘linked’ to, the receipt by Canada of strategic
advantages from another country or group of countries. Conversely,
economic sanctions or natural resource export restrictions or prohibitions
against targeted countries could be used by Canada to influence the
behaviour of the countries in question. And third, there is the
aforementioned vector connecting natural resources, renewable and nonrenewable alike, with the overall economic capacity of Canada, which in
turn informs the potency of the state’s military and diplomatic instruments.
We touch briefly on some of this economic dimension at the end of this
section, and leave for the next section our primary treatment of the
constitutional connection between strategy and economy (or industrial
might).
Questions of natural resource jurisdiction in Canada are complicated by
the necessary dichotomy between ownership of natural resources and
legislative power therefor.
As a very general rule in Canadian
constitutionalism, ownership of resources coincides with ownership of
77

Supra note 25, p. 129.
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public lands. As such, in section 109 of the 1867 Act, which for all
practical intents and purposes vests in the provinces all “lands, mines,
minerals and royalties,”78 Professor (and later Supreme Court Justice)
Gérard La Forest once remarked that the term ‘lands’ means public lands,
and that the term ‘public lands’ “also includes the ordinary incidents to
land. Thus it is clear that the word would be sufficient to include such
mines and minerals as are ordinarily incident to land.”79 This section, in
jurisprudential terms, is typically regarded as a residuary or default section
in relation to ownership of public lands and natural resources, with the
dominant presumption (buttressed by the already discussed section 117)
being that each province owns the lands and resources within its territorial
limits unless these are captured by section 108, which enumerates in a
schedule to the 1867 Act, specific “public works” and “property” in each
province that are to be the property of Canada. (These include public
harbours, lighthouses, rivers and lake improvements, and, as noted above,
such strategic assets as military roads, so-called ordnance property, and
armouries.) In the simplest terms, this means that the provinces, rather
than the federal government, are, if they so desire, as in principle able to
capture the lion’s share of economic rents (in the form of royalties, mining
taxes or bids on exploration) coming from the exploration and exploitation
of resources on their lands.80 A notable exception here is offshore
78

More precisely, the section vests public lands with the four founding provinces at
Confederation. Equivalent treatment is effectively granted Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta in the Constitution Act, 1930, and to the other provinces via their individual terms
of union.

79

Gérard V. La Forest, Natural Resources and Public Property Under the Constitution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 76.

80

Note that rent capture tends to be more pronounced as a government objective in times
of high natural resource commodity prices, as in the 1970s and indeed in the global
commodity boom that immediately preceded this time of writing. Still, not all
governments at all times will see rent capture as their primary policy objective, with some
leaving instead the capture of rents to the private sector and seeing instead, as through
much of Canadian history, the principal policy goal as consisting in natural resource
development as a fillip to economic growth, as per the staple theory of economic
development. Of course, this imperfect tension between rent capture and economic
growth betrays a policy choice for governments.
The constitutional capacity
underpinning either option, however, does not in principle change.
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resources and, even more importantly, resources in Canada’s three federal
territories, all of which are owned by the federal government.81
The general presumption of provincial ownership of lands and resources
is matched by general provincial legislative dominance in respect of
natural resources. A number of subsections of section 92 have historically
been at play here, but the critical section for strategic purposes over the
last score of years has been section 92A, also known as the natural
resource amendment, which was enshrined in the 1867 Act by the 1982

81

Federal jurisdiction over the territories is constitutionally affirmed in the Constitution
Act, 1871. The governance structures of each of the three territories—the Yukon, the
Northwest Territories and Nunavut—is provided (quasi-constitutionally, as it were, on
our conception of the Constitution), inter alia, by incorporating statutes bearing the name
of the territory in question (e.g. the Nunavut Act, 1993). These acts include the results of
some of the devolution, from the 1970s onwards, of many ‘province-like’ legislative
powers to the territories—a process which has, in practical terms, mitigated, to a certain
extent, some of the direct strategic power of the federal government in respect of the
natural resources, economic and population factors of power. [The same is true of the
several existing—although not constitutionalized—self-government agreements between
the federal government and First Nations in the Yukon. See supra note 15.] Still, unlike
in the provinces, with the exception of the Yukon, the federal government at present still
collects all the royalties from territorial non-renewable resources—royalties which the
federal government could then use in aid of the military and diplomatic instruments of the
state.
Recognizing the dichotomy between constitutional capacity and policy-political praxis—
well treated in this piece—, it is noteworthy that, in respect of offshore resources, the
federal government has made a number of policy moves, such as the 2005 Offshore
Arrangements, that have built on the 1985 and 1986 Offshore Accords that gave the
governments of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia de facto ownership of offshore
petroleum; that is, taxation of offshore resource revenues as if these resources were
provincially owned.
Note that in the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
Implementation Act, 1987, section 34(1) reads that “[w]here [...] a determination is made
that self-sufficiency and security of supply do not exist, the Federal Minister has
authority in relation to any fundamental decision [...] made during that period.” Quaere:
Is it not paradoxical, in strategic terms, that federal legislation should speak to federal
suzerainty in respect of adequacy of domestic supply of petroleum in the context of an
accord yielding to a province control of petroleum revenues, and yet not be able to
otherwise speak, as a general rule, to such ongoing adequacy of domestic capacity in
respect of petroleum revenues in any other context?
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Act.82 Section 92A states that each province, within its territorial
boundaries, has legislative responsibility for natural resources in respect of
(a) intraprovincial exploration for non-renewable natural resources; (b)
intraprovincial development, conservation and management (and, indeed,
marketing) of non-renewable resources and forestry resources; as well as
(c) development, conservation and management of intraprovincial sites
and facilities for the generation and production of electrical energy; and
that (d) each province may levy direct or indirect taxes relating to its
natural resources. In practice, these significant intraprovincial powers are
materially restricted when it comes to export of resources out of province
(given federal paramountcy) or out of Canada (given exclusive federal
jurisdiction over international trade). Provinces may also regulate
pipelines, mines and other facilities via section 92(10), provided, again,
that these do not extend beyond provincial boundaries. In the simplest
terms, provincial legislative dominance means that provinces, as a general
rule, will regulate in their own individual interests. And it stands to
obvious reason that a scenario in which each province maximizes its own
legislative interests (or, say, welfare) is hardly conducive to the
maximization of pan-Canadian or federal interests (or welfare or indeed,
ultimately, strategic power). A presumption to the contrary would be a
patent fallacy of composition; that is, a false presumption that something
that is true of the part is necessarily true of the whole.
Strictly speaking, therefore, such vesting of ownership and legislative
power over natural resources with the provinces is antithetical to the idea
of ensuring constant (standing) and adequate supply of key natural
resources for the country as a whole, and, in purely strategic terms, in the
effective, ultimate service of the military and diplomatic instruments in
particular. Writes G.V. La Forest (then not yet a Supreme Court judge) in
this respect:
The raising of a revenue is not the sole reason that public
property is of fundamental importance to the provinces. It
also provides them with a powerful instrument for the
82

In addition to section 92A, we note here, among the section 92 heads of power, section
92(13) on property and civil rights, in particular, but also sections 92(5), 92(10) and
92(16).
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control
of
their
economic
and
political
destinies. By requiring that resources from public property
be processed within its boundaries, a province can
materially contribute towards the establishment of
secondary industries there, and prevent the export of
raw material to other countries [or indeed, per section 92A,
to other provinces, provided this prohibition is for all
provinces, and provided there is no repugnancy with federal
law].83
Having established that, in terms of a national planning function,
provincial dominance over natural resources is largely astrategic, if not
anti-strategic, let us posit further than in the absence of an emergency, the
Canadian constitutional framework does not strictly vest in the federal
government the capacity to ensure or require (rather than politically
incentivize) that there be continuous and adequate supply of needed
natural resources.84 (The federal government may, in the event of a longterm dearth of, say, energy resources, acquire legislative and regulatory
responsibility for energy imports and offshore exploration, but it must for
the most part, notwithstanding the prospect of federal-provincial
cooperative agreements, defer to the legislative and regulatory lead of the
provinces in most traditional scenarios of energy exploration.)
83

Gérard V. La Forest, supra note 76, pp. xii-xiii. En passant, further to this, an
interesting line of enquiry concerns the provincial capacity to erect so-called ‘sovereign
wealth funds’—effectively, strategic revenue reserves—from their natural resource
revenues. As Alberta has proven with its Heritage Savings Trust Fund, there is evidently
no constitutional bar to provinces accumulating natural resource royalties (in addition to
other possible provincial revenues) for purposes of strategic expenditure in major
projects. The federal government may also create sovereign wealth funds for national
strategic purposes, but it clearly does not have availed to it the significant royalties from
provincial natural resources. It does, however, on top of many other revenue sources,
have general access to resource royalties from the territories (except the Yukon) and
certain offshore sources (see supra note 81). (See also the related discussion on federal
and provincial spending powers below in the section on national economic might.)

84

Strictly speaking, there is today in Canada no national policy (unlike the old National
Energy Policy) for monitoring national energy supply, and for ensuring adequacy of such
supply. Supply decisions—often market-driven, including by dint of the international
trading dynamics discussed below—are in practice made intraprovincially, both by
provincial governments and private suppliers.
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Short of an emergency, therefore, if the federal government, for
purposes of ensuring an ongoing minimal national supply of energy in the
event of a national shortage (including for the military and diplomatic
instruments of the state), wanted to create, say, a national strategic energy
(more specifically, a petroleum) reserve, it would likely have to purchase
such energy from the provinces and private suppliers at market rates. This
means that a national strategic energy reserve is constitutionally possible
(through the federal spending power, which we take up later in this piece),
but otherwise awkward (and not inexpensive)—thereby making Canada’s
constitutional framework strategically quite inefficient in respect of
ensuring adequacy of natural resources on a national scale. (Provinces, of
course, for their part, could legislate with relative ease under section 92A
to ensure adequacy of provincial supply, policy-political praxis
notwithstanding.)
Having said this, the federal government has at its disposal a number of
powerful constitutional and quasi-constitutional tools to be able to
mobilize, on an ad hoc and emergency basis, strategic or essential natural
resources where these are in short supply, poorly distributed or otherwise
needed. The most powerful of these tools is the famous Emergencies Act,
which, as stated above, is a function of the federal government’s rather
sweeping emergency powers under the emergency branch of the POGG
power in the 1867 Act. Under each of the four types of national
emergency in this Act, there are exceptional provisions—all as yet
unlitigated—that empower the government to ensure that scarce supplies
and essential resources or services are provided. In a public welfare
emergency, for instance, section 8(c) provides for federal requisition, use
or disposition of property; section 8(d) provides for the authorization of, or
direction to any person, or any person of a class of persons, to render
essential services provided there be reasonable compensation for services
so rendered; and section 8(e) provides for the regulation of the distribution
and availability of essential goods, services and resources. Or in the event
of an international emergency, the Act provides at section 30(e) for the
same power as in section 8(e), as well as for the control or regulation of
any specified industry or service, including the use of equipment, facilities
and inventory [section 30(a)], the appropriation, control, forfeiture, use
and disposition of property services [section 30(b)], and, more specifically
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to the defence instrument, the authorization and conduct of inquiries in
relation to defence contracts or defence proper, or to hoarding,
overcharging, black marketing or fraudulent operations in respect of
scarce commodities. The Emergencies Act coexists with the predecessor
Energy Supplies Emergency Act, also rooted in the federal emergency
power, which states at section 15(1), specifically in relation to petroleum
resources, that when the “the Governor in Council is of the opinion that a
national emergency exists by reason of actual or anticipated shortages of
petroleum or disturbances in the petroleum markets that affect or will
affect the national security and welfare and the economic stability of
Canada, and that it is necessary in the national interest to conserve the
supplies of petroleum products within Canada, the Governor in Council
may, by order, so declare and by that order authorize the establishment of
a program for the mandatory allocation of petroleum products within
Canada in accordance with this Act.”
Of course, as established earlier, both the Emergencies Act and the
Energy Supplies Emergency Act do not displace the entirety of the royal
prerogative of the government in respect of national security or
emergencies. Indeed, this prerogative also hovers over the controversial
‘proportionality clause’ (Article 605) in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which repeats the prohibition in the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement on Canadian restrictions of energy exports to the
United States (in the NAFTA case, to Mexico also) for reasons of national
conservation, supply shortages and price stabilization provided the share
of total energy supply available for export purchase by the U.S. (or
Mexico) from Canada falls below the average level of the previous 36
months.85 Although as yet unligated, the only apparent legislative
exceptions to this clause are found in Article 107 of the NAFTA, which
states that energy imports and exports may be restricted for reasons of
national security—that is, as defined in the Article, to the extent necessary
for Canada to (a) supply a military establishment [...] or enable fulfillment
of a critical defence contract; (b) respond to a situation of armed conflict;
(c) implement national policies or international agreements relating to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices; or (d)
85

Indeed, the Article 605 proportionality clause tracks an almost identical proportionality
clause in Article 315 in respect of all goods subject to the NAFTA.
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respond to direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials
for defence purposes. If these conditions are not met, Canada could still,
in strict constitutional terms, easily defer to the emergency prerogative (or
in extremis, the doctrine of state necessity) to assure its domestic supply—
even if this be in breach of the NAFTA, and even if this would doubtless
bring about political and strategic retaliation by the U.S. (In practice,
Canada would likely far sooner do this or, more readily, legally attempt to
justify or litigate its actions as being in accordance with Article 107, than
Moreover, as discussed above, if
rescind the treaty outright.)86
necessary—for instance, in the event of a national energy shortage—, the
federal government could arguably use its spending power to purchase
exported oil from the provinces on the free market, within the terms of the
NAFTA. Of course, this would require the federal government to
effectively outbid potential American and Mexican buyers; that is, on
volumes of oil over and above those which would have to be made
available to them, based on historic sales over a representative period—a
high price indeed for imperfect strategic efficiency.
The declaratory power in section 92(10)(c) is also available to the
federal government, via legislation, insofar as it may deem certain “local
works and undertakings” related to certain natural resources (or indeed,
food) to be for the general advantage of Canada. As discussed above, the
declaratory power was famously used by the federal government in respect
of the uranium mines after the Second World War. Indeed, the
constitutional possibility, politically realistic or not, of the declaratory
power being used by the federal government, via Parliament, to invoke
federal control of oil and natural gas during the 1970s OPEC oil embargo
was a key driver for the western provinces in the negotiations leading
eventually to the enactment of section 92A, the natural resource
amendment, in 1982, even if this section does not, in its final form, at all
address the declaratory power. 87 This would seem to reaffirm a matter
86

See Stephen McBride. “Quiet Constitutionalism in Canada: The International Political
Economy of Domestic Institutional Change” for an interesting discussion of the
effectively quasi-constitutional character of NAFTA in Canadian governance [(2003)
36:2 Cdn J. Pol. Sci. 251].

87

See the discussion of this provincial fear in J. Peter Meekison and Roy J. Romanow,
“Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the Constitution” Origins and Meaning of
Section 92A (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985), p. 18.
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that has been intimated at several points over the course of this piece—that
is, that the strategic efficacy of a given strategic section in the Constitution
may issue not only from the existence of that section, but, in practice, also
from the mere threat of its use.
One could perhaps make an ambitious theoretical argument that the
declaratory power, unlike the emergency instruments discussed above,
could also be levered by the federal government, in its general regulation
of a given essential natural resource, to ensure an ongoing or standing
country-wide supply of that same essential natural resource, including
through legislation relating to intraprovincial exploration and
development of the resource in question. One could arguably envision
such a scenario in the event that, say, a private company were to refuse or
were dilatory in exploiting or distributing energy from a prominent source
regulated by a given province. Were that energy seen by the federal
government as incontrovertibly critical to adequate national supply, the
federal government could threaten or, in the alternative, actually use the
declaratory power to assume regulatory control of a given intraprovincial
energy sector, which in turn could lead to legislation to compel the
company in question to accelerate the exploitation or distribution of
energy.
Quaere: In the alternative, could the federal government not purchase,
for reasons largely or entirely strategic, some or all of obstructionist
private company in question and assert legislative jurisdiction thereover
under section 91(1A) of the 1867 Act? Indeed, section 91(1A) states that
the federal government has legislative responsibility for its own public
debt and property. (Of course, federal executive power over such debt and
property would flow from the very fact of federal ownership, as with a
private party—rather than from the royal prerogative.) Such a scenario is
not meaningfully explored in the constitutional literature, and hardly
addressed in the case law—again, perhaps, a measure of the absence of
strategic tradition and, a fortiori, strategic thinking in Canadian
constitutional culture, even if the considerations are largely counterfactual
at this juncture. Were, however, the federal government to purchase a
proprietary interest in, say, a private energy concern in order to advance
national strategic interests, there would seem to be an uncontroversial
prima facie basis for federal laws and regulations (including requirements
for specific rates or quanta of energy production) to apply thereto. The
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holding in British Columbia v. Lafarge Canada Inc. affirms that “public
property ha[s] to encompass some element of ownership by Canada [the
Government of Canada] in order to receive constitutional immunity” from
provincial laws (in the Lafarge case, provincial-land use laws) relating to
that property.88
Indeed, provided the federal law or regulation in question relating to
the acquired property legitimately falls, in pith and substance, under a
federal head of power [section 91(1A) or other], there is little to suggest,
other things being equal, that the federal government would need to buy
anything but a minor or even nominal stake in a private company in order
to assert legislative jurisdiction thereover. Justice Bastarache implies as
much in his concurring judgment in Lafarge, writing at paragraph 123:
[T]he relevant test is whether there is evidence of a
sufficient proprietary interest in the lands on the part of the
federal Crown. [I]t is clear that Crown ownership of land
generally coincides with its prima facie classification as s.
91(1A) public property [...] [E]ven a partial proprietary
interest of the federal Crown in land will help establish a
sufficient basis for classifying the land as public property
under s. 91(1A).89
Given the considerable fiscal (revenue-collecting) capacity of the
federal government, both in absolute terms and relative to the provincial
governments, in the structure of the Canadian federation, this would seem
to given the federal government disproportionate strategic opportunity—
again, allowing for policy-political considerations—to make, or threaten to
make, targeted purchases of private or even provincial property across the
country in order to assert federal legislative jurisdiction for strategic
purposes.90 Having said this, while federal legislative jurisdiction over
88

British Columbia v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23.

89

Professor (and later Supreme Court Justice) Gérard La Forest (supra note 79 at pp.
134-135) put it thus: ‘In a word, the term “property” in section 91(1A) is used in its
broadest sense and includes every kind of asset and partial interest.’

90

Recall that the federal spending power, discussed at some length below in the section
on economic might, is also in part a function of section 91(1A). The other most relevant
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such property could be somewhat inured from relevant provincial laws of
general application by virtue of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity,91 it would be unconstitutional for the federal government to
acquire a proprietary interest in a given concern, only to proceed to
legislate (colourably), in pith and substance, in an area of provincial
competence—indeed, such as natural resources, grosso modo, under
section 92A. However, if the said legislation does indeed relate in pitch
and substance to a federal proprietary interest, and if there be a coinciding
provincial proprietary interest (with or without the existence of private
proprietary interests), then federal legislation, through the doctrine of
federal paramountcy, would naturally trump provincial legislation in
respect of that property.
Evidently, the declaratory power, discussed amply above, could also be
used by the federal government to accomplish—perhaps less ‘elegantly,’
in strategic terms—that which could otherwise be done by acquiring a
proprietary interest in a concern of national strategic interest. And, to be
sure, if pressed, the federal government has non-negligible expropriation
powers. The federal government may expropriate, for all intents and
purposes, only to achieve ends falling within its legislative jurisdiction.
So in respect of an obstructionist, unproductive or incompetent private
concern providing critical services to, say, the defence industry, it would
seem to follow that the federal government, for legislative purposes falling
under the federal militia power in section 91(7) of the 1867 Act, could
legitimately expropriate the concern. (This would in fact suggest that the
federal government has greater war-planning economic capabilities,
head of power for the federal spending power is section 91(3). Interestingly, Justice
Bastarache, again in Lafarge, supra note 88, waxes somewhat ‘strategically’—again, at
paragraph 123, noting that “a focus on the federal Crown’s proprietary interests is
consistent with the historical origins and development of federal jurisdiction over public
property as a way to ensure that the federal Crown would possess and be the proprietor of
sufficient resources to establish and maintain a transcontinental economy in the early
years of Confederation.”
91

The majority in Lafarge, supra note 88, at paragraph 55, stated: “While federal
ownership of land does not create an enclave from which all provincial laws are
excluded, provincial law cannot affect the exercise of a ‘vital part’ of federal property
rights.”
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constitutionally speaking, than meet the eye through a mere survey of
relevant ‘quasi-constitutional’ statutes under the militia power. We touch
on some of these statutes below in the section on the economy.) Wrote
Gérard La Forest:
The power of expropriation of privately owned lands would
appear to be inherent in most heads of power under section
91 of the [1867] Act,92 as well as expropriation consequent
upon a declaration of a work to be for the general
advantage of Canada under section 92(10)(c) of that Act.
This might possibly include power to expropriate land by
virtue
of
section
91(1A)
for
the
more
convenient use of public property, but this would be
narrowly construed; the head could not be used as a
colourable device for appropriating land for purposes
falling
outside
Dominion
legislative
power. The federal power of expropriation is by no means
limited to purposes coming under enumerated heads of
power; expropriation by virtue of the general power to
legislate
concerning
peace,
order
and
good government is also valid. [...] Finally, there seems no
constitutional impediment to the federal parliament
expropriating private property without compensation,
however undesirable this may be [in practice].93
The federal government would also be well within its constitutional
rights, in extremis, to expropriate provincial lands without compensation
in order to execute purposes falling squarely under a federal head of
legislative power; for instance, the building of interprovincial or
international pipelines, railways or bridges—all key to effective
92

93

See Reference re Waters and Water-Powers, [1929] S.C.R. 200.

Gérard La Forest, supra note 79 at pp. 149-150. Having said, however, that there is no
strict constitutional bar to federal (or indeed provincial) expropriation of private property
without compensation, Anglo-Canadian statutory interpretation does require such
compensation for the private owner in the absence of explicit language absolving the
expropriating government of such an obligation [Hogg, supra note 75 at p. 29-9
(looseleaf)].
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mobilization of natural resources for strategic purposes. It stands to
reason, therefore, that these federal expropriation powers—even in times
short of emergency—would increase materially to the extent that there is
jurisprudential expansion of strategic federal powers like POGG (in
particular, the said national concern branch, or even a fourth branch
dealing with matters of interprovincial significance, supra note 62) and
trade and commerce (discussed at length below).
The other dimension of supply is the actual physical security of the
natural resource in question (or indeed, parenthetically, of agriculture and
foodstuffs), as well as that of the infrastructure—so-called national critical
infrastructure—supporting its production and distribution.
The
declaratory power and the section 91 general power (POGG, under the
national concern branch), affirmed in the aforementioned Ontario Hydro
case94, were primarily concerned with such physical security in the
Canadian nuclear sector. (Ontario Hydro is arguably the only decision of
any strategic import involving section 92A since its very inception in
1982.) In that decision, Justice La Forest wrote for the majority at
paragraph 83 that he “cannot believe that [section 92A] was meant to
interfere with the paramount power vested in Parliament by virtue of the
declaratory power (or for that matter Parliament’s general power to
legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada) over [a]ll
works and undertakings constructed for the production, use and
application of atomic energy.” It follows, therefore, that in respect of
critical infrastructure like pipelines, electric generating facilities or grids,
as well as certain transport modes, even if these have an intraprovincial
character, the federal government, if it so wishes, has at least one ‘in’
through the declaratory power for regulating the security of these assets—
where these are deemed of national strategic value. Of course,
interprovincial critical infrastructure, such as certain pipelines (under the
National Energy Board Act) and railways (which we discuss below in the
section on the economy), is already regulated by the federal government
for safety and security.95

94

95

Supra note 64.

We do not attempt to address directly here the very practical (and manifestly complex)
issues relating to the fact that, as in most Western countries, the vast majority of
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Can the federal government restrict export of essential, needed or
otherwise valued natural resources to other countries or groups of
countries whose behaviour it seeks to influence? Alternatively, can the
federal government use Canadian natural resource exports or imports (or
indeed food) as a diplomatic tool to incentivize or reward another country
or group of countries? (In diplomatic terms, as mentioned above, such
transactions are often considered part and parcel of so-called ‘linkage’
strategies, whereby country A links or attaches certain benefits or
punishments for country B in a given policy area x—in the event, natural
resources—to the state of the A-B relationship in policy area y—say, in
military affairs.) Both courses of action would on their face seem
uncontroversial under the Canadian Constitution. The royal prerogative in
combination with the POGG residual branch and the trade and commerce
power [section 91(2)] as legislative heads of power, give the federal
government all the constitutional authority it needs to play such diplomatic
‘hard ball,’ as it were, should it so wish. (Of course, as discussed above,
the constitutional capacity should be seen in light of the associated federal
constitutional incapacity to easily assure constant adequate domestic
supply of key natural resources in non-emergency situations.) In practice,
the Special Economic Measures Act and the Export and Import Permits
Act, both discussed above, provide the legislative backing for such
action.96 Of course, while constitutionally permissible, such action is
Canadian critical infrastructure (even as it relates to natural resources) belongs to the
private sector. This is a policy matter (or indeed choice), and not, strictly speaking, a
constitutional one.
96

Section 21(1) of the Investment Canada Act provides for the Minister of Industry to bar
certain purchases of Canadian assets by foreign interests if he or she deems this purchase
to not be of “net benefit” to Canada. The criteria informing “net benefit” are broad—
even sufficiently broad, one could argue, as to make the often sought addition of ‘national
security’ grounds for exclusion of foreign purchasers redundant (see the May 2008
blocking by the Minister purchase of the Information Systems Business of Macdonald,
Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (DTA) by the American aerospace and defence concern
ATK, presumably on security grounds). This statute could evidently be used to
strategically block foreign ownership of certain strategic natural resources (including
energy resources), and could be have the attendant effect of blocking exports of (or in
effect ‘domesticating’) that resource, depending on the nature of the ultimate owner of
the resource.
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invariably subject to the various restrictions of relevant trade deals and
frameworks. In the NAFTA, for instance, Article 103(1) stipulates that,
subject to certain exceptions (not relevant for our purposes), there are to be
no restrictions on imports or exports of goods between the three
contracting countries. And yet, Article 103(3) stipulates, in almost the
same breath, that should the aforementioned import or export restrictions
be adopted by a given country, reprisals in the form of countervailing
restrictions are permitted. All of this, naturally, speaks to the plain fact
that, on top of it being constitutionally undisputed, the policy option of
restricting natural resource exports or imports within the NAFTA context
(and certainly outside of it), while practically available to Canada, would
evidently come with costs. (Over and above countervailing duties, to the
extent that Canadian diplomatic ‘linkage’ is applied to a strategically more
powerful or capable trading partner, such as the United States or the
European Union, one could presume that such costs could often prove
prohibitive to the imposition of such restrictions. Against a strategically
less powerful or capable partner, such as, say Mexico, however, such costs
could, in certain circumstances, very well be outweighed by the
presumptive benefits of the strategic imposition of restrictions by Canada.)
Finally, natural resources, and perhaps energy resources in particular,
in Canada are unquestionably a highly significant historical driver of the
national economy. Indeed, until the 1970s, when many Canadian
governments—federal and provincial—began to see high oil prices as a
rationale for privileging rent capture as a distinct policy objective,
Canada’s natural resources were, largely on the basis of the staple theory
of economic development, seen as a primary driver of aggregate economic
growth (or variants thereof). For our purposes, other things being equal, it
stands to reason that the larger the standing economic or industrial might
of a country, the greater its aggregate strategic strength. We take up this
very theme in the next section.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC MIGHT
National economic might or capacity is, in the most obvious sense,
connected to the military instrument by dint of the national capacity, in
both peacetime and war emergencies, for pure military production and
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indeed modernization. By this we refer to military assets like ships
(shipbuilding classically being a major economic industry), planes, tanks,
vehicles and munitions, inter alia—all expensive goods that are
necessarily underpinned by a certain economic mass. (Let us leave aside,
for purposes of this paper, the commonly understood multiplier effect of
military production on the economy or, in extremis, talk of a strict
military-industrial complex.) The federal Defence Production Act,
constitutionally authorized by the already discussed federal militia power
[section 91(7)], gives the Minister of Public Works and Government
Services the presumptive lead on organizing national defence production
or supplies required to meet the needs of the Department of National
Defence—in short, the military needs of Canada. The Act even suggests
at section 12 that “[t]he Minister shall examine into, organize, mobilize
and conserve the resources of Canada contributory to, and the sources of
supply of, defence supplies and the agencies and facilities available for the
supply thereof and for the construction of defence projects and shall
explore, estimate and provide for the fulfilment of the needs, present and
prospective, of the Government and the community with respect thereto
and generally shall take steps to mobilize, conserve and coordinate all
economic and industrial facilities in respect of defence supplies and
defence projects and the supply or construction thereof.” However,
because this section, like the rest of the Act, has not been litigated in any
strategically meaningful sense, we do not at this time of writing know the
precise parameters of the federal government’s power to substantially
organize or mobilize Canada’s defence industry (or indeed its economy at
large), at least in peacetime or on a standing basis. In the event of a
declared war emergency, of course, the Defence Production Act is
supplemented by the Emergencies Act, well treated above, which grants
the Canadian federal government, under a declared war emergency,
expansive powers of economic mobilization and organization in support of
the country’s military efforts. (Evidently, the larger the economic capacity
of the country, other things being equal, the greater its ability to support
the military campaign and related industries and production in the actual
event of war, and to deter a potential enemy in the event of threatened war,
given that the enemy would to some extent infer the war-fighting
capability of the country from its economic mass. In this latter respect,
conversely, the smaller a country’s economic capacity, other things being
equal, the less its capacity to discourage strategic confrontation or, in
extremis, military attack by another country.)
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In addition to direct defence production, there is a country’s capacity to
purchase or import from other countries the assets necessary for war
preparation (or deterrence) and war-fighting. The larger the economy,
other things being equal, the greater its purchasing power for such assets.
That said, it stands to reason that excessive importation of strategic
military assets (as with natural resources, discussed above) also poses a
significant strategic risk for a country, given its dependence on foreign
supply and supply or distribution routes that could be disrupted at critical
strategic moments. Still, strictly speaking, we will concede that the
balance between indigenous defence-related production and imported
production is very much a policy choice, rather than a constitutional
concern, and that the core strategic observation stands: the larger the
economic capacity of the state, the greater the potency of its military
instrument, other things being equal. (Of course, as established in the
natural resources section, it is not just the magnitude of the factor of
power—in this case, the national economy—that matters for purposes of
determining aggregate strategic power, but also, critically, the capacity of
the state to mobilize the factor, directly or indirectly, in support of the
cardinal strategic instruments—the military and diplomatic instruments.)
The aggregate capacity of the Canadian economy also clearly informs
Canada’s diplomatic instrument. For instance, a strong economy generally
bolsters a country’s negotiating position (indeed, its attractiveness to
potential partners) in respect of international trade and investment. It
increases the national capacity to reward other countries with such
diplomatic assets as aid, food, intelligence or information and, as
described above, natural resources sold or exported on favourable terms.
The capacity to punish—for instance, through economic sanctions or, say,
trade or investment diversion to other countries—is similarly
commensurate with the strength of the economy. What is more—and this
applies equally to the diplomatic and military instruments—, economic
capacity speaks to the sheer potential size or magnitude of the national
diplomatic and military forces; that is, in terms of total potential effectives
and associated funding.
Naturally, the aggregate capacity of the Canadian economy is a
function of an extremely complicated cocktail of variables. The same is
true of the economy’s capacity for strategic mobilization. We cannot
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possibly tease out all these variables in the context of this piece, but we
will attempt to survey some of those which presumptively provide the
essential economic backbone of Canadian strategic power. These include:
the macroeconomic capacity to resist strategic shocks; the general strength
of the national economic union; the capacity to protect or lever strategic
industries or sectors in international trade and investment agreements; and
the constitutional character of the national strategic transportation
infrastructure.
The federal government uncontroversially controls considerable
national macroeconomic instruments. In the event, therefore, of strategic
shocks directly related to the economy or bearing economic consequences
or manifestations—for instance, a foreign oil embargo à la OPEC 1973, a
concerted or unwitting run on the Canadian dollar by foreign parties or an
international banking crisis, as exists at this time of writing, or indeed
even a proper war—it is the federal government that is the presumptive
macroeconomic lead in Canada. In division of power terms, not only has
the federal government legislative responsibility for the banks under
sections 91(15) [banking, incorporation of banks and the issue of paper
money] and 91(16) [savings banks] of the 1867 Act, but, more
importantly, it has a constitutional monopoly on monetary policy, writ
large, under several sections of the 1867 Act—to wit, section 91(14) on
currency and coinage; the said sections 91(15) and 91(16); section 91(18)
on bills of exchange and promissory notes; section 91(19) on interest;
section 91(20) on legal tender; and perhaps even the federal trade and
commerce power in section 91(3), which we take up below.97 The Bank
of Canada, which evidently did not exist at Confederation, among other
97

Reference re Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2. It stands to reason that the large
number of heads of legislative power supporting the Bank of Canada Act speaks to the
breadth, and indeed, the strategic character of the Bank’s operations. The preamble to the
Bank of Canada Act states that the Bank is required to “regulate credit and currency in
the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external
value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the
general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be possible
within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial
welfare of Canada.” One could also submit, given the breadth of these activities, that the
Bank of Canada Act could also find a home under the residual or national concern branch
of POGG.
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things, regulates the national money supply, regulates inflation via the
setting of the key interest rate (or key policy rate) and has massive
capacity to inject into, or withdraw from, the banking system liquidity in
the interest of national economic goals such as price stability, protection or
promotion of the national currency and even of aggregate economic
product. The Bank operates at arm’s length from the federal government,
but is still clearly a creature of federal power.
In addition to its instruments of monetary policy, the federal
government, as discussed earlier in this piece, enjoys expansive taxation
and spending (i.e. fiscal) powers under sections 91(1A) and 91(3) of the
1867 Act, relating respectively to public debt and property and the raising
of money by any mode or system of taxation.98 Section 91(1A), in
particular, allows the federal government to borrow very significant
amounts of money—both from Canadian and international sources—in
order to drive national economic goals, bearing in mind policy-political
considerations.99 In other words, over and above monetary policy, the
federal government, in the event of a negative strategic shock, is able to
lever the far more powerful fiscal policy instrument to stimulate, propel or
stabilize the economy—over time, and other things being equal—through

98

Other sections likely (arguably) relevant to the constitutional existence of a muscular
federal spending power include sections 102 and 106 of the 1867 Act, both dealing with
federal appropriations. Section 102 states: “All Duties and Revenues over which the
respective Legislatures of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick before and at the
Union had and have Power of Appropriation, except such Portions thereof as are by this
Act reserved to the respective Legislatures of the Provinces, or are raised by them in
accordance with the special Powers conferred on them by this Act, shall form One
Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for the Public Service of Canada in the
Manner and subject to the Charges in this Act provided.” Section 106 states: “Subject to
the several Payments by this Act charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada,
the same shall be appropriated by the Parliament of Canada for the Public Service.” Of
course, for both sections, “Public Service” of Canada is to be understood broadly—that
is, something approximating the general welfare of the country (and certainly not as
referring the federal civil service proper!).

99

One might presume that section 91(4) of the 1867 Act, referring as it does to the
borrowing of money on the public credit, would also be a relevant head of power for
federal debt. However, the jurisprudence on this section is paltry, and it would thus seem
that section 91(1A) is the dominant supporting head of power.

2009]

CONSTITUTION AND STRATEGY

71

deficit spending100; or, via section 91(3), to play with tax rates and
incentives for the same purpose.
The British historian Niall Ferguson is perfectly direct in his
recognition of the strategic import of national debt (fiscal policy) and
central banks (monetary policy) over the ages. He posits the evolution, by
the eighteenth century, of four peculiar national institutions (a so-called
100

Note the enormous constitutional flexibility of the federal spending power. Hogg,
supra note 26 at pp. 174-175, suggests: “[T]he better view of the law is that the federal
Parliament may spend or lend its funds to any government or institution or individual it
chooses; and that it may attach to any grant or loan any conditions it chooses, including
conditions it could not directly legislate. There is a distinction, in my view, between
compulsory regulation, which can obviously be accomplished only by legislation enacted
within the limits of legislative power, and spending or lending or contracting, which
either imposes no obligations on the recipient (as in the case of unconditional grants) or
obligations which are voluntarily assumed by the recipient (as in the case of a conditional
grant, a loan or a commercial contract). There is no compelling reason to confine
spending or lending or contracting within the limits of legislative power, because in those
functions the government is not purporting to exercise any peculiarly governmental
authority over its objects.” Even Brun and Tremblay, supra note 24 at p. 433, concede as
much: « Les provinces et le fédéral peuvent donc faire ce qu’ils veulent de leurs avoirs.
Ils peuvent les dépenser dans les domaines de l’autre ordre de gouvernement sans régir
ceux-ci législativement. » They add, however, this proviso at p.432 in respect of
conditionality attached to the (federal) spending power: ‘Il n’en reste pas moins que la
décision dans Winterhaven [Winterhaven Stables Ltd. v. Attorney General Canada
(1986), A.J. No. 460] laisse croire qu’à partir d’un certain stade, l’imposition de
conditions peut changer le caractère véritable d’une législation et la rendre vulnérable.
Ainsi, le fédéral était intervenu trop activement dans une matière provinciale lorsqu’il a
légiféré sur l’assurance-chômage (avant qu’il ne réussisse à se faire transférer la
compétence à cet égard) [Attorney-General Canada v. Attorney-General Ontario, [1937]
A.C. 355]. Le fédéral avait plaidé que par son pouvoir de taxer, il pouvait constituer un
fonds, et que par son pouvoir relatif à la propriété fédérale, il pouvait ensuite en disposer
à sa guise. Mais le Conseil privé jugea la loi invalide parce qu’en réalité elle réglementait
ce secteur de la vie sociale. Dans un jugement plus récent, le juge Pigeon, au nom d’une
majorité de juges de la Cour suprême, a exprimé l’opinion suivante: « …l’intrusion
fédérale dans le commerce local est tout aussi inconstitutionnelle lorsqu’elle se fait par
des achats et des ventes que lorsqu’elle se fait d’une autre manière. » [Reference re
Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198] Cette affirmation laisse voir
que le simple droit d’agir (en achetant, en vendant ou en dépensant, par exemple) peut
devenir vulnérable s’il fait partie d’une intervention qui se veut régulatrice. Divers dicta
dans l’affaire Dunbar [Dunbar v. Attorney-General Saskatchewan (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th)
374] accréditent aussi cette approche.’
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“square of power”) designed for the financing of wars by states. The first
two are a national parliament and a tax-gathering bureaucracy. He goes on
to write:
Third, a system of national debt allowed a state to
anticipate tax revenues in the event of a sudden increase in
expenditure, such as that caused by a war [or, indeed, some
other strategic event, shock or crisis]. The benefit of
borrowing was that it allowed the costs of wars to be spread
over time, thus ‘smoothing’ the necessary taxation. Finally,
a central bank was required not only to manage debt
issuance but also to exact seigniorage of paper money,
which the bank monopolized.101
One of the great and interesting strategic complications with the federal
fiscal instrument, however, is that—constitutional division of powers
oblige—the provincial governments also have a constitutional capacity to
borrow102—from intraprovincial sources, national and international
sources—on top of their own quite expansive spending powers based on
section 92(5) [the management and sale of the public lands belonging to
the province and of the timber and wood thereon], the historically
important property and civil rights power in section 92(13), as well as on
section 92(2), which relates to direct intraprovincial taxation for the
raising of revenue “for provincial purposes.”103 Note that the turn of
phrase “for provincial purposes” has, for all intents and purposes, become
constitutionally nugatory; that is, according to Hogg, quoting Chief Justice
Duff in the Unemployment Insurance Reference104, it means only that
101

Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000
(New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 15.
102

The provincial borrowing power is arguably rooted in section 92(3) of the 1867 Act,
which relates to the borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province.
103

We might also add, in support of the provincial spending power, sections 109 and 117
of the 1867 Act, both discussed previously in this paper.
104

Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1936] S.C.R. 427. The
subsequent appeal to the Privy Council, while dismissed on the facts of the case, resulted
in dicta that famously defended the federal spending power—to wit: “That the Dominion
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‘revenue is raised “for the exclusive disposition of the legislature.”’105
Hogg also notes the following:
In fact, the provinces have never recognized any limits on
their spending power and have often spent money for
purposes outside their legislative competence, for example,
by running a commuter train service on interprovincial
trackage, by acquiring an airline, by giving international
aid, or by paying casino profits to Indian communities.106
This effectively means that, while the federal spending power is
constitutionally very expansive (in theory limited, other things being
equal, only to how much money the federal government can raise), and is
nowhere necessarily displaced by provincial spending power (itself also,
in theory, a function of the provincial capacity to raise money), its
potency, in strategic terms—that is, in advancing national strategic ends—
may be notably mitigated or obstructed should one or more provinces use
their spending power for ends incommensurable or indeed at direct crosspurposes with such national strategic ends. (Unlike with legislative
powers, there is no doctrine of federal paramountcy in respect of spending
powers—hence our peculiar interest in the matter.) Conversely, the
federal spending power could be buttressed or magnified in the event that
provincial spending powers are used in strategic alignment with the
federal power—that is, for strategic purposes consistent therewith.
Indeed, if one carefully examines, in structural terms, the federal political
drama unfolding at this time of writing in Ottawa—where the
Conservative government, but for prorogation of Parliament, would have
faced an apparently unwinnable vote of confidence on a December 2008
may impose taxation for the purpose of creating a fund for special purposes, and may
apply that fund for making contributions in the public interest to individuals, corporations
or public authorities, could not as a general proposition be denied.” [Attorney-General of
Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1937] A.C. 355]. (Hogg supra note 26 at pp.
366-367)
105

Hogg, supra note 26 at p. 177. See affirmation of the same in Brun and Tremblay,
supra note 24.
106

Hogg, supra note 26 at pp. 177-178.
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fiscal update or economic statement that seemed exceedingly meek in
using the federal fiscal instrument to stimulate a recessionary economy—,
it could well be submitted that the federal government was in fact waiting
to coordinate its fiscal stimulus package with those portended by the
provinces; hence its apparently dilatory action. This line of reasoning
would be strongly supported by the fact that, prior to the release of the
stimulatory budget at the end of January 2009, an important first
ministers’ meeting or conference was convened between Prime Minister
and premiers to discuss the economy and to coordinate fiscal policy. Such
fiscal coordination, of course, were strategic considerations at the fore of
the policy agenda, would be influential in determining the extent to which
Canada’s economic and other factors of power could be mobilized in aid
of the state’s principal strategic instruments.
Having said all of the above, the critical economic mass or motor
which drives the country, and indeed informs federal spending or fiscal
capacity, including in respect of the military and diplomatic instruments,
consists largely in the Canadian economic union. As such, having largely
treated the federal government’s direct macroeconomic tools, it is most
apposite, strategically speaking, to determine the microeconomic capacity
of the federal government in respect of this union. (This capacity relates
directly to the overall magnitude of the economy as a factor of power.) In
particular, we refer here to its capacity to directly influence the ‘tightness’
or cohesion of the said Canadian economic union (a microeconomic
concern) with the indirect objective, naturally, of maximizing its national
growth or total product or output (a macroeconomic concern).
In respect of the domestic economic union, Michael Trebilcock has
suggested that it is quite ‘tight’ or cohesive already, writing the following:
Canadians share a common currency, a closely harmonized
tax system, a developed rail and highway transportation
infrastructure, and all provincial governments are
constrained by section 121 of the Constitution Act [1867],
which guarantees that all goods must be permitted to move
within Canada without being made subject to provincial
tariffs. Since the addition of the Charter [...] in 1982,
Canadians have also benefited from section 6, which
guarantees personal mobility rights and the right to pursue a
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livelihood in any province of Canada. Furthermore [...],
Canadians have also benefited from relatively unhindered
capital flows and freedom of investment within Canada.107
Indeed, several studies have suggested that the welfare gain to be had from
perfect economic union in Canada—that is, one denuded of internal
economic barriers—would be in the realm of one to one and a half
percent.108 (This would presumably include the much vaunted creation of
a national securities commission, or the elimination of barriers thereto.)
On a static model, this would seem to suggest the maximum magnitude of
possible improvement of Canadian economic capacity in the event that the
federal government had the requisite constitutional capacity to remove all
such barriers. However, on a dynamic model, where the economic factor
of power is mixed with other factors of power, such as natural resources or
population (or even the ‘pure executive,’ diplomatic and military factors),
this maximum could substantially increase, as would its potential impact
on overall Canadian strategic capacity.
As mentioned early on in this piece, the federal trade and commerce
power in section 91(2) of the 1867 Act—prima facie the key constitutional
head of power for direct microeconomic intervention or indeed legislationled planning—has been largely confined to international and
interprovincial trade by dint of restrictive jurisprudence initiated by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. (Contrast this with the
expansive interpretation given by the courts in Australia to the so-called
corporations power in section 51(xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, 1900 and the commerce clause in Article 1, section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, both of which have greatly facilitated the erection of
107

Michael J. Trebilcock, “The Supreme Court and Strengthening the Conditions for
Effective Competition in the Canadian Economy” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 542 at pp.
550-551. We should stress that Trebilcock refers to the economic union in terms of
economic efficiency. Such internal efficiency is not inconsistent with the notion that
there are a number of ‘north-south’ or Canada-U.S. trading corridors for which bilateral
trade volumes are in actuality greater than interprovincial trade volumes. See Thomas
Courchene, “Federalism and the New Economic Order: A Citizen and Process
Perspective” (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2002), pp. 7-8.
108

Ibid., p. 553.
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a more cohesive economic union within each federation.) Exclusive
federal jurisdiction over international and interprovincial trade is the soidisant first branch of the trade and commerce power, conditioned by
expansive jurisprudence by the Privy Council in respect of the provincial
property and civil rights power in section 92(13) of the 1867 Act; that is,
in respect of most intraprovincial microeconomic transactions.109 The soidisant second branch of the trade and commerce power, relating to the
federal capacity to regulate general trade for the entire country, was
revived by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1989 General Motors v.
City National Leasing case, in which Justice Dickson established a fivepart test for determining whether Parliament had constitutional authority
for regulation of general trade.110 That holding has reignited speculation
that the federal general trade regulatory power will be strengthened over
time, in particular as the Canadian economic union and global economic
dynamics become ever complex. (We discuss the international trade
dimension of this speculation below.) What is more, the logic of the
Dickson test is, in at least its fourth and fifth parts, distinctly similar to the
logic underpinning the national concern branch of the POGG power (well
treated above), which is also generally considered to be of potentially
expansive consequence for federal constitutional jurisdiction.
As
Monahan suggests, “the crucial question in applying the fourth and fifth
criteria under the general regulation of trade test is the need to ensure that
Parliament is able to respond effectively to national economic

109

The nomenclature for the first and second branches of the trade and commerce power
come from the 1881 Privy Council decision in Citizens’ Insurance v. Parsons, [1881] 7
A.C. 96. See supra note 23 for discussion of this case and the ‘grammatical’ genesis of
the Privy Council’s expansive treatment of the provincial property and civil rights power.
110

General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641. The
five parts of the test are to be seen as a general guide for constitutionally valid legislation,
rather than a pedantic check-list of required criteria. These five parts state that
constitutional validity exists if: the impugned legislation is part of a regulatory scheme;
the scheme is administered and overseen by a regulatory agency; the legislation is
concerned with trade in the country as a whole, rather than trade in a particular industry;
the legislation is of such a nature that the provinces jointly or severally would be
constitutionally incapable of enacting it; and failure to include one or more provinces in
the legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of that scheme.
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problems.”111 (emphasis added) One might also offer that the possible,
embryonic fourth branch of the POGG power—that of matters of
interprovincial significance—could be at play here, over time, in
strengthening, through jurisprudential channels, federal powers over the
national economic union.112
Doubtless an effective economic union requires not only centralized
legislative capacity to remove barriers to economic flows, but also direct
and meaningful circumscription of provincial capacity to erect barriers or
blocks to such economic flows. And on this front, section 121 of the
1867, which reads that “All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or
Manufacture of any one of the Provinces Shall, from and after the Union,
be admitted free into each of the other Provinces,” having been interpreted
by the courts in the narrow sense of prohibitions on strict interprovincial
customs duties, has proved remarkably inadequate in removing barriers to
internal trade.113 In other words, section 121 has proved an insufficient
bar to provincial laws and regulations that are deliberately or inadvertently
inconsistent with a maximally efficient national economic union.114 On
111

Monahan, supra note 13, p. 296. It may also be noted that the potential (eventual?)
expansive force of the federal trade and commerce power is slowly trickling its way into
policy-political praxis. Note the interesting undertaking (or, in strategic terms, the
possible threat) of the federal Conservative Party in their 2008 general election platform:
“A re-elected Conservative government led by Stephen Harper will work to eliminate
barriers that restrict or impair trade, investment or labour mobility between provinces and
territories by 2010. In 2007, the government announced that it was prepared to use the
federal trade and commerce power to strengthen the Canadian economic union. [...] We
[...] are prepared to intervene by exercising federal authority if barriers to trade,
investment and mobility remain by 2010.” (emphasis added) [Conservative Party of
Canada, The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper’s Plan for Canadians,
(Ottawa, 2008), p. 16]

112

Ibid, pp. 271-276.

113

The holding in Gold Seal Ltd. v. Dominican Express Company, [1922] 62 S.C.R. 424
has proved to have distinctive staying power in this regard.

114

Of course, policy plays hugely here as well, and policy-political context is immensely
germane to the choices made by governments. Notes Courchene, supra note 107 at p. 12
on this matter: “[What] is increasingly the essence of nation building are [sic] citizenbased issues as they relate to information empowerment, human capital development, and
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top of this, the jurisprudence on what has been called ‘negative
[economic] integration,’ which is the removal of such barriers to the
economic union, has been less than definitive in denuding the union of
barriers to maximal efficiency.115 We discuss section 6 Charter mobility
rights in the next and final section on population.
On top of the cohesion or force of the strict domestic economic union,
the economic capacity of Canada is doubtless also a function of its
capacity to effectively (dare we say, muscularly) negotiate international
trade and investment agreements that serve to buttress national strategic
power, including by increasing the magnitude (or ‘mobilizability,’ as it
redressing the actual and potential income-distributional fallout from the new global
order. The challenge for some federal systems, and certainly the Canadian federation, is
that many of these citizenship issues fall under provincial jurisdiction. In some areas,
Ottawa (more generally, central or federal governments) can mount a reasonable case on
policy, if not on constitutional grounds, for becoming more involved in some of these
areas. For example, with knowledge on the cutting edge of competitiveness, Ottawa will
be a meaningful player in human capital development no matter what the [C]onstitution
says since the country’s competitiveness is at stake. In many other areas, however,
federal systems are likely headed for considerable jurisdiction[al] in-fighting as central
governments are going to be driven in the direction of catering to the citizen-related
issues, traditionally the domain of sub-national governments.”
115

Monahan, supra note 13, at pp. 307-310 is fairly optimistic in his interpretation of the
holdings in two cases in particular, Morguard and Hunt, in respect of the potential
efficiency of the economic union, pending further litigation. He asserts that these
holdings suggest that the source of legislation to enhance the proper functioning of the
economic union is “the entire framework and structure of the Canadian constitutional
order” (p. 307). (This would seem consistent with the thrust of this paper—to wit, that
the framework and structure of the Canadian Constitution are pregnant with immense
strategic possibilities, in practice, for the Canadian state.) He suggests that this provides
justification for federal legislation to create a national securities commission, legislation
to prevent the establishment or maintenance of restrictions on free interprovincial
movement of persons, goods, services or investments, as well as legislation to provide to
create a common set of rules for mutual recognition of standards and regulations by
provinces. Trebilcock, supra note 107, for his part, seems less optimistic about the net
verdict emerging from the accumulated jurisprudence to date on negative integration. He
notes at p. 571 that the Supreme Court’s “negative integration case-law seems much more
equivocal, contradictory, and less well-developed than the counter-part body of U.S.
Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence [...] or for that matter [than] the
National Treatment jurisprudence developed under the GATT/WTO.”
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were) of the economic factor of power. And, indeed, a pivotal aspect of
this negotiating capacity consists in the capacity of the federal government
to protect or lever so-called ‘strategic sectors’—evidently, in aid of
national aggregate power.
Of course, as mentioned above, in Canada, negotiation of international
commercial agreements is, strictly speaking, a federal responsibility, but
implementation, as discussed above, grâce à Labour Conventions, is
divided among the federal and provincial levels of government insofar as
the agreement in question deals with questions that fall into both their
respective jurisdictions. And, as established, this in practice compromises
not only the total Canadian capacity for meaningful implementation of
complex, cross-jurisdictional ‘deliverables’ emanating from international
agreements, but often, just as signally, the capacity of the federal
government to effectively or decisively assume certain negotiating
positions, given the prospective uncertainty or controversy relating to
implementation at provincial levels.
While we observed above that international treaties and agreements
were a diminishing dimension of modern diplomacy (and indeed strategy),
it stands to reason that these same agreements continue to have material
impacts on the economic factor of power, and that, as such, the strategic
stakes of proper negotiating capacity for the state are not inconsiderable.
Of interest, for purposes of our analysis, therefore, is the existence of a
growing body of scholarship116 suggesting that the Supreme Court,
building on a stream of dicta in a number of cases, and also taking heed of
the changing international economic environment, could well see it fit to
qualify or substantially soften (although likely not outright reverse) the
116

See Trebilcock, supra note 107; also Robert Howse, “The Labour Conventions
Doctrine in an Era of Global Interdependence: Rethinking the Constitutional Dimensions
of Canada’s External Economic Relations” (1990) 16 Can. Bus. L.J. 171; and finally H.
Scott Fairley, supra note 20, as well as in “External affairs in the Constitution of Canada”
(1987) 16 Can. Council Int. L. 220. Note, however, that French Canadian scholarship,
including by Brun and Tremblay, supra note 24, remains highly laudatory of Labour
Conventions, and would doubtless prove highly critical of any reversal of this holding.
Hogg, supra note 26 at p. 505, is notably agnostic in respect of such an eventuality in his
assessment of the evolution of jurisprudence on the second branch of the federal trade
and commerce power.
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categorical bifurcation of treaty implementation powers from Labour
Conventions. Such a qualification or softening, on this line of argument,
would be rooted in either the national concern branch of the POGG power
or the said second (or general trade) branch of the trade and commerce
power in section 91(2) of the 1867 Act. Notes Stephen McBride in this
respect: “Trade agreements are now based on deep integration, are no
longer confined to goods and are inextricably linked to investment. In
these circumstances, the reach of the federal Trade and Commerce power
might be interpreted as a much more substantial foundation for federal
jurisdiction than formerly.”117
Whether such a retreat will actually happen at the Supreme Court is not
at all evident. An outright reversal of Labour Conventions seems highly
improbable in the foreseeable future, given the long-standing incumbency
of this decision and the anticipated political implications, particularly in
Quebec, of such a drastic shift in the jurisprudence.118 Still, were there
anything approaching such a shift, particularly given growing international
competition for trade and investment advantage, and in spite of the
diminishing import of international treaties in foreign affairs proper, this
would be a non-negligible fillip to Canadian economic (and ultimately
strategic) capacity.
Of particular strategic relevance in respect of international trade and
investment, as mentioned above, is the historically important capacity of
the federal government to protect or lever for Canadian strategic
advantage or interest (that is, in the service of one or more of the factors of
power, or directly in the service of one or both of the diplomatic and
military instruments of power) key ‘strategic’ industries or sectors of the
Canadian economy. Due to the potential number of such strategic
industries or sectors, it would be impossible to give this aspect of
Canadian strategic capacity a proper treatment in this paper, although we
have elsewhere effectively done so in respect of natural resources (in
particular, Canadian energy resources) and, by limited proxy, food. Other
117
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Supra note 86, p. 261.

See supra note 24 about anticipatory political considerations in Privy Council and
Supreme Court decision-making.
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strategic sectors that would need to be constitutionally canvassed in order
to make a determination of aggregate federal strategic capacity in this
regard could include the finance sector, communications, certain
manufacturing sub-sectors and indeed transportation—to which we now
turn, albeit not with a view to examining international trade and
investment dimensions of the national transportation infrastructure.
We might propose that transportation infrastructure, of the various
species of infrastructure, has been singularly salient in Canada’s economic
narrative. (Just as saliently, transportation infrastructure is an aspect of
Canada’s economy that can manifestly be mobilized in direct support of at
least one of the two key strategic instruments of Canadian power—that is,
the military instrument. 119)
Canadian strategic transportation
infrastructure, despite the relative constitutional weakness of Canada’s
economic union, is largely regulated by the federal government. (As a
strict policy matter, much of this infrastructure, across the various
transport modes, as with certain critical infrastructure discussed in the
natural resources section above, is owned by the private sector.)
Railways, historically and indeed presently still strategically critical to
Canadian power (especially in relation to the economy and the military
instrument), are principally regulated by the federal government. This
regulation exists primarily on the strength of section 92(10)(a) of the 1867
Act, which places under federal jurisdiction (or, more precisely, exempts
from provincial jurisdiction) lines of steam or other ships, railways,
canals, telegraphs, and other works and undertakings connecting a
province with any other province, or extending beyond the limits of a
province, including internationally. (Notably, the interpretation by the
courts of ‘works and undertakings’ has as a rule been very expansive—
that is, taken to include both physical and organizational elements, and
taken to be undivided in jurisdictional scope—that is, with federal
jurisdiction over interprovincial works or undertakings extending even to
local aspects of the work or undertaking in question.) As for noninterprovincial or local railways, as discussed previously, these have often
119

Note the direct military import accorded railways in section 51(xxxvii) of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, which states that the Commonwealth has
legislative power over “the control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and
military purposes of the Commonwealth.”
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been declared by the federal Parliament to be for the general advantage of
Canada, and as such have been transferred from provincial to federal
jurisdiction. (This is to say nothing of the broad federal expropriation
powers outlined in our section on executive potency, as well as the federal
executive expropriation power for military purposes in section 117.)
Interprovincial and international shipping also falls under federal
jurisdiction under sections 92(10)(b) and 91(10). [By comparison, the
trade and commerce power in section 92(2), because it has historically
been interpreted so narrowly by the courts, has had little direct impact on
the rail sector, or any of the other transport modes in Canada, for that
matter.]
The other ‘heavy-lift’ transport mode is air travel. Like the rail mode,
its regulation is dominated by the federal government under the Canada
Transportation Act (exclusive federal responsibility for air services in
Canada) and the Aeronautics Act (exclusive federal responsibility for
safety and security of passengers, aircraft and airports). The Supreme
Court famously determined that aeronautics was an indubitable national
concern under the federal POGG power in the 1952 Johannesson v. West
St. Paul case120, noting “the rapid growth of passenger and freight traffic
by air, the use of aircraft for the carriage of mails especially to the more
remote northern parts of the country, and the necessity for the
development of air services to be controlled by a national government
responsive to the needs of the nation as a whole”121

POPULATION
As discussed above, the exclusive constitutional capacitation of the
provinces in section 93 of the 1867 Act to legislate in respect of education
is a patent strategic weakness in the Canadian federation, other things
being equal (that is, in spite of, say, the cultural benefits of localized
public education)—in particular in respect of developing the ‘talent’ pool
120
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Hogg, supra note 26, p. 441.

2009]

CONSTITUTION AND STRATEGY

83

necessary to populate and animate the state’s diplomatic and military
instruments. This weakness exists notwithstanding the considerable
federal spending power in respect of education and ‘human capital’
training or formation, a theme typically falling, in legislative terms, under
the broad provincial property and civil rights power in section 92(13).122
The power to directly tailor curricula to meet national objectives—
strategic and otherwise—is clearly an advantage from which only unitary
countries like New Zealand and the United Kingdom can profit, and
which, in strategic terms, are the envy of complex federations like
Canada.123
For purposes of economy, however, we have decided not to belabour in
this paper the idea of education as a material contributor to the population
element or factor of power. This decision is best explained by the
proposition that, assuming a generally high level of country-wide
education (as exists and will arguably always exist in Canada), the greater
strategic advantage in ‘population’ terms come from sheer numbers, or
sheer, manageable numbers. In short, a better or more ‘strategically’
educated population of 33 million (Canada’s present population) is of
122

Of course, in practical terms, this spending power has been curtailed by the last
several federal governments, both by dint of federal-provincial agreements and federal
restraint (although such restraint has been well short of meeting the standard of
constitutional convention). Indeed, the last Harper government flirted with the idea of
passing a proper statute constricting the use of the federal spending power. (Of course,
such a statute, were it ever enacted, would still be sub-constitutional—at least for a while,
on our conception of the Constitution—and would still be trumped by sections 91(1A)
and 91(3), inter alia, and jurisprudence supporting the constitutional legitimacy of the
federal spending power. See, notably, Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General
of Ontario, [1937] A.C. 355.)
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Consider the question of languages and Canadian strategic leadership in the Americas
region—an aspiration articulated by the last Harper government. Whence the critical
mass of Spanish or Portuguese speakers so clearly necessary—particularly in the
diplomatic and military arms of the federal government—for successful advancement of
such an aspiration? Absent a major, sustained push by the federal government via its
spending power or via federal-provincial coordination, the federal government must rely
largely on the otherwise independent educational regimes of the various provinces—and
the independent policy-political choices of their various governments—to generate, over
a sustained period, a sufficient number of individuals with the appropriate linguistic
training.
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substantially less strategic benefit to Canada than a population of, say, 60
or 70 million people educated at today’s standards (even if the pedagogy
be ‘astrategic’ or largely controlled by the provinces). To put it crudely, at
60 million people, Canada would have the demographic mass of today’s
France or Great Britain, but with greater geography and natural resources.
Writes John Mearsheimer:
[T]he size of a state’s population and its wealth are the two
most important components for generating military might.
Population size matters a lot, because great powers require
big armies, which can be raised only in countries with large
populations. States with small populations cannot be great
powers. [...] Population size also has important economic
consequences, because only large populations can produce
great wealth, the other building block of military power.124
More exotically, though, for our purposes, if Canada could also properly
or effectively distribute such a greater population across its land mass (that
is, in accordance with national strategic objectives—say, in respect of
creating more and bigger cities and economic centres, or with respect to
the assertion of sovereignty in the North), the strategic impact would be all
the greater: the economy would be larger (not least given the economic
synergies created by big cities), natural resources more potently exploited,
and the diplomatic force and army larger, since the pool of talent from
which to draw the effectives to populate these instruments would, of
course, be far larger.
Granted, immigration aside, the federal government has certain key
constitutional tools at its disposal to attempt to increase the national
population [namely the tax and spending power in sections 91(1A) and
91(3), inter alia, of the 1867 Act]—say, to create reproductive tax
incentives or baby bonuses to increase the indigenous birth rate. At the
same time, however, many equally critical constitutional powers
(microeconomic, education, health care) relevant to family planning are at
the provincial level. In addition to, or in place of incentivizing an
124

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 2003), pp. 60-61.
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increased national birth rate, the other essential constitutional power for
increasing national population is that of immigration. And immigration,
as mentioned earlier in this piece, is a joint federal-provincial power under
section 95 of the 1867 Act, with federal paramountcy.125
The federal government sets national immigration targets annually
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. It is required by the
Act to consult with provinces in setting these national targets, but the Act
notes clearly that one its many (indeed, often contradictory) goals is to
enable the federal government to determine the demographic or population
structure of the country. Quebec, more than the other provinces, has its
own immigration regime, in legislative terms, stemming from this Act and
based on an agreed division of labour with the federal government in
which the province is responsible for selection of immigrants to its
province (e.g. enrichment of the sociocultural heritage of Quebec,
economic benefit and consistency with Quebec’s demographic goals),
while the federal government preserves overall responsibility for national
standards of admission of immigrants into Canada, including in respect of
screening for national security purposes. Let us say that, on our use of the
nomenclature, this agreed division of labour between the federal
government and Quebec on immigration, being little susceptible to change
(in general terms), has effective quasi-constitutional status.126
Even with the sui generis Quebec immigration arrangement, the federal
government has uncontroversial constitutional capacity to determine the
125

Section 91(25) of the 1867 relates to naturalization and aliens. This is a rather
idiosyncratic head of power in the sense that little has been legislated on its basis, and, as
a consequence, there has been little litigation in respect of it. The Citizenship Act
arguably falls under this section.
126

Strictly speaking, the federal government has formal agreements with each of the
provinces on immigration, pursuant to section 8(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act [and also section 5(1) of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
Act]. These agreements include provisions for provincial nominees—a class of
immigration that is fast growing in importance. However, the Canada-Quebec regime is
strategically sui generis in respect of the degree to which it transfers upstream policymaking powers (i.e. selection and admission) to the province, as well as the degree to
which it has as one of its express objectives the preservation of the demographic weight
of Quebec within Canada.
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aggregate number or quantum of immigrants entering Canada, as well as
the rate of such entry; and, as a consequence, given the necessary census
or statistical data, the net rate of growth of the Canadian population
resulting from immigration. That the federal government may therefore
choose to grow the aggregate Canadian population in order that it reach a
certain threshold of strategic moment is beyond constitutional reproach.
Evidently, in purely practical terms, mass increases to immigration
levels do not come without concrete policy-political costs, including
significant additional upstream costs related to increased security and
quality screening, as well as downstream costs relating to integration and
social services. In particular, any increase in aggregate immigration to the
country would likely have to be in keeping with the Canada-Quebec
Accord of 1991 on immigration. One notable objective of the Accord, as
stated in section 2, is to preserve the demographic weight of Quebec
within Canada and to integrate immigrants to Quebec in a manner that
respects the province’s distinct identity. To the extent that we see this
Accord as quasi-constitutional, we can see it as materially complicating
the otherwise uncontroversial constitutional capacity of the federal
government to increase Canada’s overall population—whether or not such
demographic increase is conscientiously aimed at bolstering national
strategic power. Although the wording in the Accord is not tantamount to
a guarantee, it would seem reasonable to expect that the annual growth in
Canadian immigration would in practice be capped less by the global
supply of immigrants than by the global supply of immigrants susceptible
to integration into Quebec society as a proportion of the total global
supply of immigrants. [Section 12(c) of the Accord states that Canada
shall not admit any immigrant into Quebec who does not meet Quebec’s
selection criteria.]
What of the ‘quality’ of the immigrants Canada may select—that is, the
ability or ‘talent’ of immigrants, even over time and through offspring, to
directly increase the potency of the strategic instruments of the state or the
underlying factors of strategic power? Prima facie, there is nothing
barring the federal government, in constitutional terms, from determining
the quality of the immigrants entering Canada, something it currently does
through the various classes of immigration in the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act. It follows that in the event that the federal
government were interested in a particular immigrant or immigrant group
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(say, for strategic reasons), there would be no constitutional bar to that
particular immigrant or group being specifically targeted and recruited by
the government—even, of course, if this meant the alteration of existing
classes of immigration in statute, or the creation in statute of new classes
of immigration. Of course, such recruitment of talent by the federal
government would need to be consistent with the said Canada-Quebec
Accord.
One additional, constitutionally relevant key driver of strategic power
in respect of the population factor, as mentioned, is that of demographic
distribution. Massively increased numbers of immigrants would arguably
bring greater strategic (and indeed social) benefit to the country if properly
and deliberately distributed across the country’s physical territory.127 As
mentioned above in this section, such distribution could at minimum serve
to create critical economic masses in cities (and indeed more cities), and
assert sovereignty—including through the military instrument—in
underpopulated parts of Canada’s huge geography, such as the North, the
Maritimes and the Prairie provinces. Manifestly, though, such talk raises
the vexed question of whether the federal government could meaningfully
control the distribution of immigrants—as a shorthand, effectively, for
strategically controlling, over time, the distribution of its aggregate
population.
A federal requirement of immigrants to live in area x (as opposed to
area y) of the country for a period of time (t > 0) could well be a prima
facie affront to the mobility rights in section 6 of the Charter. (Section 6
rights, let us recall, are inured against the notwithstanding clause in section
33.) Indeed, there has to date been no jurisprudence on this very fact
pattern to guide us (and precious few section 6 cases at the Supreme Court
altogether), so our analysis will have to be largely counterfactual. We
know section 6(2) states that every citizen and permanent resident of
Canada has the right (a) to move to and take up residence in any province;
127

This is perhaps a rebuttable presumption. One asks why France and the United
Kingdom have only, say, two very large cities for population bases of around 60 million
each. One could respond to this, arguendo, by suggesting that physically vast, populous
and indeed strategically powerful countries like Russia, the United State and China, by
contrast, all have at least half a dozen very major urban-cum-industrial centres spread
across their respective territories.
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and (b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
Furthermore, the rights in section 6(2) are subject to the limitations in
section 6(3); that is, (a) any laws or practices of general application in
force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons
primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence; and (b)
any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a
qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services. Finally,
section 6(4) provides that none of the above precludes any law,
programme or activity that has as its object the amelioration in a province
of conditions of individuals in that province who are socially or
economically disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is
below the rate of employment in Canada.
Would the said (re)distribution requirement in respect of immigrants be
constitutional? Were the required distribution or redistribution in question
strictly intraprovincial (say, from big city a to smaller city b in the same
province), rather than interprovincial, then there would be no breach of
section 6 rights. The question of constitutionality would turn on whether
the enacting government was justified on the basis of the division of
powers scheme in the 1867 Act. In the event, were the federal government
the enacting party, what head of power would be availed it? As
established several times over in this paper, the 1867 Act is silent on the
question of ‘strategy’ per se. The federal government could not therefore
argue before the courts that it is interested in redistributing masses of
people (in the event, immigrants) for purposes of growing its strategic
power. (This brings us to a crucial point that is woven throughout this
paper—to wit, could the courts ever fathom recognizing ‘strategy’ as a
proper end of the state? We take this up very soon below.) A possible
alternatives could consist in the use of the federal POGG power—in
particular, the residual branch as it relates to national security, or, more
precisely, say, sovereignty. Still, this rationale is unlikely to be credible
before the court. A far more likely scenario, sub-constitutionally, is that
the federal government would have to strike an agreement with a
province—the proper enacting party for matters within the province—to
require such intraprovincial distribution of immigrants. (The federal
government could, of course, arguably go it alone if there were a question
of distributing immigrants within or indeed between any of the three
federal territories.)
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Naturally, talk of strict intraprovincial or intraterritorial distribution of
population (especially immigrants) must struggle with the possibility that
immigrants may simply, of their own volition, jump from province to
province (or territory, or from territory to province), as is their prima facie
constitutional right—at least insofar as the taking up of residence or the
pursuit of a livelihood is concerned.128 In this case, one might observe that
section 6(2) refers only to citizens and permanent residents, and not to
aspiring immigrants who are not yet permanent residents—technically,
foreign nationals. Thus it is conceivable that the federal government,
should it wish to do so, could easily impose certain residency conditions
on foreign nationals pending, or as a condition of, their receipt of
permanent resident status in order to populate areas of strategic interest for
the state. (Of course, on the current practice, leaving aside policy-political
costs, this does not leave much time—a few years on average—for the
foreign national to actually reside in his or her designated location before
possibly acceding to permanent resident status; although, indeed, the
period preceding accession to permanent resident status could well be
increased in law or regulation.) Moreover, as per the ruling in Canadian
Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson129, the designated residency
requirement could theoretically be applied to even permanent residents
and citizens if, as per section 6(3), the mobility discrimination against the
individual in question is not primarily on the basis of residence. In this
sense, the majority of the Supreme Court in Canadian Egg held that
sections 6(2) and 6(3)(a) should be read as a single right, stating:
Section 6 of the Charter guarantees the mobility of persons,
not as a feature of the economic unity of the country, but in
order to further a human rights purpose. It is centred on the
individual. Section 6 relates to an essential attribute of
personhood that mobility in the pursuit of a livelihood will
not be prevented through unequal treatment based on
residence by the laws in force in the jurisdiction in which
that livelihood in pursued. Given this purpose, the focus of
128

Provinces and territories are one and the same thing for purposes of the application of
Charter rights, as per section 30 of the Charter.
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the analysis in s. 6 is not the type of economic activity
involved, but rather the purpose and effect of the particular
legislation, and whether that purpose and effect infringe the
right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
residence in the pursuit of a livelihood.
The Court, building on this logic, determined that, to the extent that the
mobility discrimination in question is legitimately—indeed, primarily—
premised on a constitutional head of power, and not residence, a limitation
on mobility would be constitutional. Of course, this begs the same
question as above: could the federal government argue that strategy is a
legitimate purpose, in constitutional terms? Or could it, more or less
‘colourably,’ offer cognate justifications rooted in, say, a national security
or even economic premise?
The pure strategic justification or line of constitutional defence, on
section 6 grounds, for such a distributive scheme would seem rather
improbable, given the general and indeed wholly explicable domestic orbit
in which Canadian constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship have
developed. (That said, perhaps an ostensibly colourable national security
or economic line or argument could work: The North needs more people
to secure the Arctic against foreign encroachments, given climate
change—to take but one example that may be ‘low-hanging fruit.’) And
this therefore leaves us with only section 1 of the Charter as a possible
‘saving clause’ for the apparent breach of section 6 rights that would be
caused by any forced or required (re)distribution of Canadian citizens or
permanent residents for primarily strategic reasons. Section 1, of course,
“guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.” This provision is famously adjudicated by
the Oakes test,130 in which Chief Justice Dickson set out a four-part test
for determining what in fact were these soi-disant “reasonable limits.”
Justice Dickson said that an impugned provision could be saved under
section 1 if there were proof of a pressing and substantial objective; a
rational connection between the provision and the objective; minimal
impairment of an individual’s rights and freedoms; and a predominance of
130
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benefits from the said provision vis-à-vis the negative impact on the
associated rights. These considerations are patently domestic in their
concern. They ignore strategy as a legitimate end of the Canadian state,
evidently even in the said context of (the values of) a “free and democratic
society.” And yet the jurisprudential record in respect of Oakes, while
inconsistent and non-uniform, suggests that a limitation on mobility rights,
even for strategic purposes, if reasonably presented, could well be justified
as pressing and substantial (first branch of the Oakes test), a standard on
which the courts are usually very deferential to the government. The
limitation might also pass the second branch—that of rational connection,
even if a domestically-focused court would be hard-pressed to be
persuaded of the rational connection in policy between population
distribution and strategic weight.131 However, where the limitation would
likely falter is at the third branch of the test—that of minimal impairment,
upgraded in later jurisprudence to an impairment that is as little “as
reasonably possible.”132 It stands to probable reason that the courts would
strike down the limitation as not being the best among more reasonable
alternatives for growing the strategic might of the state—constitutionally
legitimate alternatives the permutations of which are discussed throughout
this piece. Of course, some of these alternatives, depending on the factor
or element of power to which they relate, are, as it were, more strategic
than others—and this line of reasoning suggests that the courts, despite the
absence of any such tradition, would be somewhat knowledgeable in
respect of, or ‘culturally’ attuned to considerations of strategy.

CONCLUSION
Canada has a Strategic Constitution. The Canadian Constitution,
despite its manifestly astrategic conception, can in general terms be
131
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employed with great flexibility by a given government, should the
requisite strategic policy acumen and political will be there, to project
significant power through the state’s diplomatic and military
instruments—directly or through the mediation of the said factors of
strategic power. In and of themselves, Canada’s diplomacy and military,
as both elements and instruments of power, are, with only a few
exceptions, largely untrammelled, in constitutional terms—rooted as they
are in the royal prerogative. These instruments are in turn supported by a
number of critical elements or factors of power, each of these with its
particular constitutional limitations, in most cases related to the federal
division of powers (textual and jurisprudential), and in a few cases
occurring as a result of Charter limitation. In the aggregate, however, the
picture painted in this piece is of a Canadian Constitution that does not, in
principle, inhibit considerable strategic action by the state—again, even if
such strategic action was not envisioned by the Fathers of Confederation
and subsequent constitutional draftspersons, and even if such strategic
action is little explored (and indeed understood) in our country’s
constitutional jurisprudence. This is not an unremarkable paradox.
Indeed, one observes, arguably, with some of the pronouncements and
moves made by the last Harper government (in particular in respect of
Afghanistan and the military), that such strategic intent, whatever one
makes of the particular virtues of the strategic ends pursued, may, to some
extent, be crystallizing. If this be the case, the Constitution will not inhibit
it, and will in many cases aid it—even if the road be on occasion indirect
or tortuous.

